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Kleven: The Supreme Court, Race, and the Class Struggle

THE SUPREME COURT, RACE, AND
THE CLASS STRUGGLE
Thomas Kleven*
The "civil rights" era of the 1950's and 1960's was a revolutionary time in our society, as black people struggled to enter the
mainstream of American life. As a result of the civil rights movement, it seems fair to say that finally, more than a century after the
abolition of slavery, blacks have attained equal legal rights-the
right to attend the same schools as whites; the right to participate
in the political process; the right not to be discriminated against in
public accommodations, housing, and employment.1 Consequently,
blacks can be found today in virtually every walk of life in greater
2
numbers than ever before.
But despite these strides and the visible improvement in status, equality of legal rights has not led to a real opportunity to enjoy the benefits of our society for vast numbers of blacks who
still live in segregated and deteriorated neighborhoods, 3 attend
segregated and inferior schools, 4 and experience far greater unemployment and under-employment than whites. 5 The disparity be* Professor of Law, Thurgood Marshall School of Law, Texas Southern University. B.A., 1964; LL.B., 1967, Yale University.
1. That is not to say these legal rights have been fully effectuated, as is
illustrated by the multitude of complaints of racial discrimination coming before our
courts and administrative agencies.
2. There are, for example, more black politicians, black professionals, black
suburbanites, and so on. Nevertheless, blacks are proportionately far
underrepresented in these areas. See H. ROSE, BLACK SUBURBANIZATION 1-26
(1976); U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, PUB. NO. 80, THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
STATUS OF THE BLACK POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES: AN HISTORICAL VIEW,
1790 TO 1978, at Table 109 (Black Elected Officials), Table 55 (Black Persons Em-

ployed in Selected Professional Occupations) (Series P-23, 1979) [hereinafter cited as
BLACK POPULATION].

3. See DeLeeuw, Schnare & Struyk, Housing, in THE URBAN PREDICAMENT

119, 145-68 (W. Gorham & N. Glazer eds. 1976).
4. As of 1972, 63.7% of all black public school pupils still attended schools in
which a majority of the students were black, and 45.2% attended schools in which
more than 80% of the students were black. UNITED STATES COMMMISSION ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, TWENTY YEARS AFTER BROWN 48 (1975) (Table 2.1) (equality of educa-

tional opportunity).
5. Between 1959 and 1978 the annual average unemployment rate for blacks in
795
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tween median family income of white and black families has actually increased over the past two decades. 6 These facts illustrate that
what now holds black people back in our society is not the denial
of legal rights, but the lack of access to the economic and social
resources necessary to the exercise of those rights. As such,
the plight of blacks today must be seen as part of a larger class
struggle 7 which affects other ethnic minorities and poor whites as
well. 8
the labor force ranged from a low of 6.4% in 1969 to a high of 13.9% in 1975, and
during that period was at all times roughly twice the unemployment rate of whites.
BLACK POPULATION, supra note 2, at Tables 47 and 154.
6. In 1959 the disparity between median white and black family incomes (adjusted to 1974 dollars) was $4,814. Id. at Table 14. By 1970 the disparity rose to
$7,397 (adjusted to 1979 dollars); and in 1979 it was $8,876. U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, PUB. No. 125, MONEY, INCOME AND POVERTY STATUS OF FAMILIES AND

PERSONS IN THE UNITED STATES: 1979, at Table 4 (Series P-60, 1980) [hereinafter

cited as MONEY]. Statistics can, of course, be manipulated. Thus, while the absolute
gap between white and black family incomes has widened, the gap has narrowed in
relative terms. But even these figures do not present a particularly heartening picture. In 1959 the ratio of black to white median family income was .52 (in 1974 dollars). BLACK POPULATION, supra note 2, at Table 14. It increased to .61 in 1970 (in
1979 dollars), but by 1979 had dropped back to .57. MONEY, supra. Of particular relevance to this Article is the status of the very poor. In that regard, the percentage of
black persons below the poverty level declined from 55.1% in 1959 to 31.3% in 1977.
BLACK POPULATION, supra note 2, at Tables 33 and 146. While that is a substantial

decline, it still left 7.7 million blacks in poverty status in 1977 (as compared with 9.9
million in 1959 and only 7.1 million in 1969). Id. And it is tempered significantly
when compared with the poverty status of whites which declined from 18.1% to
8.9% (or from 28.3 million persons to 16.4 million) during that same period, and in
light of the fact that most of the decline occurred between 1959 and 1969 when the
figure for blacks was 32.2%. Id. It may be more than coincidence that the leveling
off of overall black economic progress in the 1970's has been paralleled by an
increasing reluctance on the part of the Supreme Court to intervene.
7. Every society is structured to some degree along class lines, by which I
mean the Uneven distribution of society's goods (e.g., wealth, education, employment), one's position in the social hierarchy, and accordingly one's prestige and
power being dependent on how much of those goods one possesses. Many commentators have noted the class aspects of American society. See, e.g., L. DUBERMAN, SOCIAL INEQUALITY: CLASS AND CASTE IN AMERICA (1976); D. ROSSIDES, THE AMERICAN CLASS SYSTEM (1976). The term class struggle as used in this Article refers to

the efforts of those lower in the social hierarchy to move up and to the inevitable
conflicts which arise when those higher in the hierarchy attempt to preserve their
positions. The intensity of the struggle is a function of the rigidity of the class structure, i.e., the degree of mobility up and down the social hierarchy. The degree of
mobility is in turn related to the proper role of the courts in the class struggle. See
note 114 infra and accompanying text.
8. This is not to say the struggles of blacks and poor whites are identical, or
that their interests always coincide. In addition to classism, blacks are also held
down by the racism which still pervades our society, and sociologists are currently
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The civil rights era produced many court battles, and the Supreme Court played a major role in easing the transition to equal
legal rights; first by striking down state laws discriminating against
blacks, and then by legitimizing federal legislation protecting
blacks against discrimination. But as the battle shifted in the 1970's
from one of race to one of economics, the Court became less willing to intervene. This Article chronicles and suggests reasons
for the change in the Court's attitude, with the goal of assessing
what this experience tells us about the judiciary's role in the class
struggle.
Arguments for and against judicial intervention in the class
struggle were ably made a decade ago by scholars who anticipated
the debate that would unfold before the Supreme Court. 9 Now
that the Court has taken a stance, it seems worthwhile to reconsider the issue in light of what the recent cases contribute to our
understanding. While I will argue for greater judicial involvement
than the current Court deems appropriate, my purpose is not to
rail against decisions with which I disagree, but to make a reasoned
case for an approach to Supreme Court intervention in the future.
In the meantime, class-struggle issues may continue to come before state courts which will be searching for guidance as to how to
proceed.
A HASTY RETREAT
The Supreme Court's role during the "Warren Era" in helping
establish equal legal rights for blacks, and in opening up the possi-

debating the issue of whether the primary problem facing black people today is racism or classism. See C. WILLIE, CASTE AND CLASS CONTROVERSY (1979); W.
WILSON, THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE (1978). The issue is largely one of
degree, however, as there is general agreement that both are real problems. But the
struggles of blacks and poor whites do overlap to the extent that both groups are
seeking access to those resources necessary to get ahead in life, and that many of the
legal issues arising from the struggles will be fought on economic rather than explicitly racial grounds. At the same time, we will continue to have cases fought on racial
grounds, many of which may pit blacks and whites seeking access to the same resources against each other. The affirmative-action cases are examples. E.g., Fullilove
v. Klutznick, 100 S. Ct. 2758 (1980); United Steel Workers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 272
(1979); Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).

9. See Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969); Winter, Poverty, Economic Equality, and
the Equal Protection Clause, 1972 SuP. CT. REV. 41. See also Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of Constitutional
Equality, 61 VA. L. REV. 945 (1975).
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bility of court intervention in the class struggle as well, has been
documented elsewhere. 10 Therefore, I will merely highlight the
thrust of the major decisions in order to set the stage for discussing
the "Burger Court's" reluctance to intervene.
The most significant Warren Era decision, of course, was
Brown v. Board of Education," in which the Supreme Court outlawed state-mandated school segregation as violative of the equal
protection clause. In the process, the Court articulated the profound moral sentiment that "[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal."' 2 In 1955 the Court delayed rapid enforcement
of Brown by establishing the "all deliberate speed" doctrine.' 3 But
by 1964 the Court was ready to begin vigorous enforcement,
stating that "the time for mere 'deliberate speed' has run out.' 4
That notion was reinforced four years later when the Court held
that Brown required segregation to "be eliminated root and
branch,"'5 and that "the burden on a school board today is to come
forward with a plan that promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to work now."1 6
Spurred on, no doubt, by the Warren Court's intervention in
the struggle for racial justice, litigants began to attack governmental practices which were alleged to discriminate against poor people. The Court responded favorably with rulings ordering free
counsel17 and transcripts' 8 for indigents in criminal proceedings,
striking down the poll tax,' 9 and invalidating durational residency
requirements for welfare recipients. 20 Although these cases were
fought on economic grounds, they also had strong racial overtones.
10. See, e.g., A. Cox, THE WARREN COURT chs. 2-3 (1968).
11. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
12. Id. at 495. That same sentiment led the Warren Court to strike down
government-mandated segregation across the board in a series of per curiam opinions. These cases are collected in L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §
16-15, at 1020 n.7 (1978).
13. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) [hereinafter cited as
Brown II].
14. Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 234 (1964).
15. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968) (citations omitted).
16. Id. at 439 (emphasis in original).
17. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (free counsel on appeal); Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (free counsel in felony cases). In Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), the Burger Court extended the right to an attorney at
trial to misdemeanor convictions resulting in imprisonment.
18. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (free transcript on appeal).
19. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
20. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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Poor blacks in our country are subjected to the criminal process in
disproportionate numbers; the poll tax was widely used as a means
to disenfranchise blacks; and a significant migratory pattern of the
1950's and 1960's was that of blacks, many of whom were dependent on welfare for a new start, moving from the South to the
North.
The interventionism of the Warren Era carried over into the
initial years of the Burger Court, which upheld busing as a
desegregation remedy, 2 1 held northern de facto school segregation
unconstitutional, 22 and overthrew as violative of due process the
termination of welfare benefits without a prior hearing. 2 3 Language
such as the following from Goldberg v. Kelly 24 must have given
hope to many that the Court could be counted on for continuing
support in the class struggle:
From its founding the Nation's basic commitment has been to
foster the dignity and well-being of all persons within its borders. We have come to recognize that forces not within the control of the poor contribute to their poverty. .

.

. Welfare, by

meeting the basic demands of subsistence, can help bring within
the reach of the poor the same opportunities that are available to
25
others to participate meaningfully in the life of the community.
But the tune quickly changed as the Burger Court sounded retreat in a series of cases which came before it during the 1970's.
These cases, whether fought on racial or economic grounds, present at heart class-struggle issues arising out of the depressed
socio-economic situation in which poor blacks, as well as other minorities and poor whites, now find themselves.
The class-struggle cases of the 1970's are outgrowths of the
dramatic change in living patterns that has occurred in our society
over the past few generations. Large numbers of blacks and other
minorities have migrated to central cities in both the North and
South. Simultaneously, middle- and upper-income whites have left
the cities for the suburbs, motivated in part by a desire not to live
near blacks and poor people. The impact has been to draw off

21. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
22. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 413 U.S. 189 (1973). De
facto segregation refers to acts of governmental officials designed to foster segregation, though in the absence of laws mandating it.
23. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 264-65.
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much of the central cities' tax base while the demand for governmental services has increased due to the influx of poorer people.
The suburbs have been able to maintain healthy tax bases due to
the unavailability of suburban-housing opportunities for lowerincome people, caused in part by exclusionary zoning. Because
suburbs can thus afford to charge lower taxes, industries in many
locales have left the central cities for suburbia, thereby exacerbat26
ing unemployment among the poor and minorities.
The overall picture is dismal. Blacks, other minorities, and
lower-income whites are trapped in central cities whose declining
tax bases make it increasingly difficult to provide governmental
services and are unable to escape to the suburbs where better education, housing, and jobs are available. The picture may be overgeneralized a bit-there is some indication that middle- and upperincome whites are starting to move back to the central
cities27-- but the generalization holds true in varying degrees in
many metropolitan areas.
This situation has spawned a number of lawsuits, and a strong
case can be made that the Supreme Court's response has facilitated
the process of central-city isolation and suburban insulation. Two
types of suits have arisen: those directly attacking the poverty
problems of locked-in central-city dwellers, and those attempting
to open up suburbia to them.
One way of directly attacking poverty problems is to reduce
reliance on local taxes to finance public services and have higher
levels of government assume greater responsibility. This forces
middle- and upper-income suburbanites to share in the cost of
urban-poverty problems. San Antonio Independent School District
v. Rodriguez28 is such a case. There lower-income residents of an
inner-city (largely Chicano) school district brought a class action
against state and local education authorities, claiming that Texas'
substantial reliance on local property taxes to finance public education denied them equal protection. They argued that their district,
having a poor tax base, would have to tax property owners at a
much higher rate than richer districts in order to furnish the same
26. See ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, IMPROVING URBAN AMERICA: A CHALLENGE TO FEDERALISM 201-21 (1976). But see

note 136 infra and accompanying text.
27. See, e.g., Schurmann & Close, The Emergence of Global City U.SA., THE
PROGRESSIVE, Jan. 1979, at 27; Fleetwood, The New Elite and an Urban Renaissance, N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1979, § 6 (magazine), at 16.
28. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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per-pupil dollar expenditure as the richer districts provided.2 9 Had
the Court been willing to intervene, the state would have had to
devise an alternative method for financing public education yielding a greater degree of equality. Presumably that would require
redistributing wealth from richer to poorer school districts. But despite substantial interdistrict disparities in ability to finance education and in educational expenditures, five members of the Court
were unwilling to hold lower-income people (or lower-tax-base districts) a suspect class or education a fundamental right. 30 Consequently, the state's school-financing scheme was not subjected to
the strict-scrutiny test applicable in suspect-class and fundamentalright cases. Instead, because of the state policy of fostering local
control of education, the Court found the financing scheme
satisfied the more lenient minimum-rationality test applicable in
3
other equal protection cases. '
A second approach to directly attacking poverty is illustrated
by Dandridge v. Williams, 32 in which welfare recipients challenged
Maryland's maximum grant provision imposing an upper limit on
the amount of Aid to Families with Dependent Children which any
family could receive. 3 3 The provision prevented large families from
receiving additional aid. Had the complainants been successful, a
wholesale attack on the adequacy of welfare payments would surely
have followed. However, although the state's standard-of-need figures showed that families subject to the cut-off would receive inadequate aid to meet their minimum needs, 34 the Court held the
provision not violative of equal protection in that larger families are
not a suspect class and there were valid reasons supporting the
cutoff provision, namely, "encouraging employment and avoiding
discrimination between welfare families and the families of the
working poor." 35 Moreover, in analogizing Dandridge to businessId. at 11-13.
30. Id. at 17-39.
31. Id. at 40-50.
29.

32.
33.

397 U.S. 471 (1970).
Being disproportionately poor, see note 6 supra, minorities also tend to be

disproportionately represented in welfare programs, again reflecting the overlap behveen racial and class-struggle issues. The Department of Health, Education and
Welfare reported, for instance, that as of March 1977, 43% of the families receiving
Aid to Families with Dependent Children, 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1976), were black, 12%
Hispanic, and only 41% white. H. OBERHEU, AID TO FAMILIES WITH DEPENDENT
CHILDREN, A CHARTBOOK 28-29 (HEW Publ. No. (SSA) 79-11721, 1979).
34. 397 U.S. at 473-75; see note 167 infra.
35. 397 U.S. at 486.
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regulation cases in which the Court gives virtually total deference
to legislative determinations, the36 Court signaled its intent to stay
out of substantive welfare issues.
If poverty could not be attacked directly, locked-in central-city
dwellers might try to follow departing middle- and upper-income
whites to the suburbs, and if successful in so doing might thus deter white flight. Several Supreme Court decisions relate to this approach. The first is Milliken v. Bradley,37 a school-desegregation
case. Detroit had engaged in intentional segregation of its public
schools. The district court's ability to formulate an effective remedy
was stymied, however, by the fact that as blacks had migrated into
the city, so many whites had left or enrolled their children in private schools that roughly 65% of the school children in Detroit
were black and the figure was rising rapidly. 38 In response, Judge
Roth formulated a remedial decree requiring 53 suburban school
districts surrounding Detroit to participate in a desegregation
plan. 39 But the Supreme Court overruled on the ground that it was
inappropriate to include the suburban districts absent a showing
that they had engaged in intentional segregation themselves. 40 Sus-

36. Id. at 484-86. In the words of Justice Stewart, who wrote the majority opinion: "[Tihe intractable economic, social, and even philosophical problems presented
by public welfare assistance programs are not the business of this Court." Id. at 487.
The Court has since remained true to that pronouncement. In Jefferson v. Hackney,

406 U.S. 535 (1971), the Court upheld Texas' practice of providing recipients of Aid
to Families with Dependent Children only 75% of their standard of need, while
paying 100% to the aged and 95% to the disabled and blind. The Court's seemingly
contrary position in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), can be explained on the
ground that the case involved a procedural due process issue, the right to a hearing
before termination of welfare benefits, with respect to which the Burger Court has
been more willing to intervene. It should be noted, however, that procedural issues
are not free of economic, social, and philosophical problems. A prior hearing, for example, will mean that pending the hearing's outcome some people who are no
longer eligible for welfare, and who may request a hearing though they know they
are no longer eligible, will continue to receive payments which the government will
never be able to recoup. That cost, along with the cost of providing the hearings,
will result in either higher public expenditures to run the welfare program or lower
benefits to eligible recipients.
37. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
38. See Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582, 585-86 (E.D. Mich. 1971), aff'd,
484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973).
39. Bradley v. Milliken, 345 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Mich. 1972), rev'd, 418 U.S.
717 (1974).
40. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741-52 (1974). Again, the majority's rationale was the sanctity of local control. Id. The Court has ruled that a predominantly white area may not withdraw from a preexisting school district found to have
engaged in segregation if the effect would be to impede desegregation efforts.
Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
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taining such a burden would seem to be extremely difficult. First,
intentional segregation must be shown for each school district included in the desegregation plan. Second, having few minority residents, suburban districts could argue that they have not engaged
41
in any segregation of "their" students.
Then in Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler42 the
Court held that once desegregation of an intentionally segregated
school system is achieved, there is no obligation to continue
desegregation efforts if resegregation occurs as the result of privately initiated changes in the living patterns of blacks and
whites. 43 The clear message of Milliken and Pasadena to whites
wishing to avoid having their children attend school with blacks is
that by using their greater economic resources to isolate themselves in suburbia they can do so. 44 The issue would thus become
more one of residential than school segregation. But the residential-segregation issue itself has been before the Burger Court,
41. Interdistrict relief has been ordered by a few lower federal courts after a
finding of interdistrict violations consisting of the racial gerrymandering by the state
of school-district boundary lines, as well as state-supported housing discrimination.
See, e.g., United States v. Bd. of School Comm'rs, 456 F. Supp. 183 (S.D. Ind. 1978),
aff'd in relevant part, 637 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 114 (1980);
Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428 (D. Del.), aff'd per curiam, 423 U.S. 963
(1975).
42. 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
43. Id. at 435-37. Presumably what complainants must do is prove new intentional acts of segregation by government officials subsequent t6 the achievement of
desegregation. See Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977) (purposeful
and not just effectual discrimination must be shown). But in light of the fact that
Pasadena had been desegregated for but one year before resegregation began to occur, the Court could easily have attributed the resegregation to the initial acts of segregation and regarded the new desegregation order as a continuation of the original
one. That had been pretty much the Court's approach in Green v. County School
Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); see text accompanying note 73 infra.
44. At the same time, in cases like Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S.
526 (1979) and Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979), the Burger
Court has insisted that school districts maintaining segregation as of 1954 (whether
de jure or de facto) have a continuing obligation to remedy it if they have not already
done so, and has upheld remedial orders including such measures as massive
intradistrict busing. There is something disturbing in all this, however, since such
rulings may well induce the very white flight which the Court refused to deal with
in Milliken and Pasadena,and thus also contribute to the fiscal difficulties of providing quality education which the Court refused to deal with in Rodriguez. For
discussion of the extent to which intradistrict desegregation plans induce white
flight, see Coleman, Liberty and Equality in School Desegregation, 6 Soc. POL. 9
(1976); Ravitch, The White Flight Controversy, 51 PUB. INT. 135 (1978); Rossell,
School Desegregation and Community Social Change, 42 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.,

Summer 1978, at 133, 148-69.
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as lower-income and minority people have attempted to break
down the exclusionary-zoning barriers many suburbs have erected.
Again the Court has not responded favorably.
First, the Court has made it difficult even to get into court. In
Warth v. Seldin45 the Court denied standing to challenge the
zoning ordinance of a Rochester, New York, suburb to low- and
moderate-income plaintiffs (who were also racial and ethnic minorities) who alleged they were unable to find housing in the community due to exclusionary practices. A builders' association which alleged that exclusionary practices prevented its members from
constructing low- and moderate-income housing there was also
denied standing. According to the Court, these plaintiffs lacked a
"personal stake" in the outcome of the litigation in that they failed
to show a particular excluded housing project in which they might
live or which they desired to build. 46 Requiring plaintiffs to specify
a particular project substantially hinders their access to the courts.
What profit-making builder would be willing to expend the time
and money to develop and propose a particular project on the offchance of winning a lawsuit several years down the road? And how
many nonprofit entities could afford to do so? 47 Furthermore,
Warth implies that even a successful lawsuit will result at best in
an order allowing the particular excluded project to be built, and
not in the wholesale revision of zoning necessary to remedy exclu48
sionary practices.
Nor have complainants fared better on the merits once in
court. At issue in James v. Valtierra49 was the validity of a
California constitutional provision stipulating that public housing
could be built in a community only upon the approval of its electorate. Suburbanites desiring to insulate themselves from the poor
could further that result simply by voting down proposed public45.

422 U.S. 490 (1975).

46. Id. at 515-16. Also suing in Warth were taxpayers of Rochester who claimed
the exclusionary practices of the suburb (Penfield) injured them by forcing them to

bear a greater share of the taxation costs of providing for the housing needs of lowerincome people, and taxpayers of Penfield itself who claimed deprivation of the opportunity to live in an economically and ethnically balanced community. Standing
was denied on the grounds that they were indirectly raising the rights of third parties (i.e., excluded lower-income people). Id. at 508-10. But then the Court went on
to deny standing to the low-income plaintiffs as well. Id. at 502-08.
47. One such suit brought by a nonprofit organization is Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Auth., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
48. See text accompanying notes 200-217 infra.
49. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
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housing projects. After a few rejections local public officials would
likely get the message not to propose more public housing. Yet the
Supreme Court denied an equal protection challenge to the provision on the ground that persons eligible for low-income housing are
not a suspect class. As a result, the state was not required to show
a compelling interest.5 0 The Court also held that there was a rational basis for subjecting public housing to more rigorous approval
requirements than other housing because of the increased tax burden existing residents might have to bear, and also because of the
51
devotion to democracy which the referendum process reflects.
Then in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Development
Housing Corp.,52 a case involving an equal protection attack
against the zoning practices of a Chicago suburb on the basis of racial discrimination, the Supreme Court held that the mere showing
of a disparate racial impact was insufficient to make out an equal

protection violation, and that discriminatory purpose or motive
must be shown before the strict-scrutiny test will be employed. 53
Taken together, Valtierra and Arlington Heights, along with

the principles articulated in Rodriguez, 54 make it very difficult to
mount an effective exclusionary-zoning challenge in the federal

courts. If the suit is based on discrimination against low-income
people, the import of Valtierra and Rodriguez is that the state
must only demonstrate a rational basis justifying its approach to
zoning. The suburb's argument is that zoning is entrusted to individual communities in the name of local control and that its zoning

is motivated not by animus toward lower-income people but by a
50. Id. at 141-43.
51. Id. at 142-43.
52. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
53. Only 25 of Arlington Heights' 64,000 residents were black according to the
1970 Census. Id. at 255. The Supreme Court remanded Arlington Heights for a determination as to whether the refusal to rezone the complainant's property for subsidized housing violated the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1976). 429
U.S. at 271. On remand the Seventh Circuit held that a showing of a racially discriminatory effect will under appropriate circumstances (detailed in the opinion) be
enough to make out a Fair Housing Act violation, though discriminatory intent cannot be proved. 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978). That
holding is consistent with the Supreme Court's interpretation of other civil rights
laws. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (employment discrimination under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976)). But
the relief to be obtained for a Fair Housing Act violation is likely to be limited, as
with Warth, to the required approval of a particular project rather than a wholesale
revision of zoning. And even that relief may be thwarted by a community's showing
that other more appropriate sites are available and zoned for subsidized housing.
54. See text accompanying notes 28-31 supra.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1981

11

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 3 [1981], Art. 3
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9 795

desire to protect its tax base, prevent environmental problems, and
preserve its suburban character. If the suit is based on racial discrimination, the difficulty is that zoning on its face is racially neutral, and as a result of Arlington Heights the fact that few minorities live in a community is not enough to make out a race case.
The complainants must presumably submit affirmative proof that
the zoning was racially motivated, and that showing may be impossible. While there is evidence that racial prejudice does often underlie zoning, 55 all the proponents of exclusionary zoning must do
to protect themselves is to conceal their real purpose and continually emphasize the rationales enumerated above. Tacit agreements
56
are hard to prove by affirmative evidence.
Even the occasionally favorable result is illusory. In Hills v.
Gautreaux,57 where the Chicago Housing Authority and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) were found
to have engaged in racial segregation by locating public-housing
projects exclusively in black neighborhoods, the Supreme Court
upheld a remedial order which required future public housing to
be located in white neighborhoods both within Chicago and in outlying suburbs. 58 Milliken v. Bradley was distinguished in that the
55. See Branfian, Cohen & Trubek, Measuring the Invisible Wall: Land Use
Controls and the Residential Patterns of the Poor,82 YALE L.J. 483 (1973).
56. The proof problem is even more difficult in light of City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976), in which the Court rejected a claim
that a city charter provision requiring zoning changes to be ratified by a 55% majority vote of the electorate constituted an improper delegation of legislative authority.
Id. at 672-80. As in Valtierra, the Court's decision was based on the devotion to democracy which the referendum process reflects. As a practical matter, the opportunity to build lower-income housing in most suburbs often depends on a developer's
ability to obtain a zoning change, most suburban zoning ordinances being more restrictive (particularly with respect to density requirements) than is economically feasible for such housing. A city council deciding on a zoning change will usually have
before it written recommendations from the city's planning agencies, and those documents together with the council's public debate could serve as evidence in a claim
of purposeful racial discrimination. Such a record is absent when the electorate as a
whole makes the decision. The most that might be available would be the public
statements of individual citizens or lobbying groups which may or may not reflect
the reasons why most voters voted the way they did. If motive is the key, however, it
would seem a complainant must show enough voters rejected a zoning change for
improper reasons (i.e., racial discrimination) to swing the election. Such proof will be
hard to come by. And while few city charters contain a required referendum procedure for zoning changes, permissive referenda at the initiative of a certain percentage of the electorate are common provisions of state constitutions and city charters,
and could be used to prevent the construction of lower-income housing while
masking the underlying racial motives.
57. 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
58. Id. at 296-300.
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remedial order ran to the Housing Authority and HUD, both of
which had jurisdiction beyond Chicago's city limits; whereas in

Milliken Detroit had no authority to administer schools beyond its
borders. 5 9 Thus the local-control policy underlying Milliken was
not implicated. However, the Court recognized the potential intru-

sion on suburban prerogatives and took away with one hand what it
gave with the other by holding that in carrying out any remedial

order the Housing Authority and HUD would still
be bound by lo60

cal zoning laws and local approval requirements.
As of the end of its first decade, then, the Burger Court has
substantially retreated from the Warren Court's commitment to

desegregation, and has virtually closed the federal courts to classstruggle issues. It remains to explore the reasons why.
WHAT WENT WRONG-

THE COURT AND TE

61
POLITICAL PROCESS

It is tempting to place responsibility for the Burger Court's retreat on the Nixon appointees-Burger, Blackmun, Powell, and
Rehnquist. These men have consistently come out against the complainants in the class-struggle cases discussed in the preceding section, and they replaced justices-Warren, Fortas, Harlan, and
Black, respectively-at least some of whom might at first blush
have been expected to be on the opposite side. President Nixon intentionally appointed "strict constructionists," a term which in the
political context of the times meant being less solicitous of individual rights and more deferential to legislative actions. He did so because he felt, probably correctly, that the public believed the
Court had gone too far in protecting individual rights, particularly
in the area of integration.
On closer examination, however, it is not clear just how much
59.
60.

See text accompanying notes 37-41 supra.
425 U.S. at 303-06.

61. The interaction between the courts and the political process is essentially
what this Article is about. That issue has been widely ventilated by other scholars
upon whose thinking the balance of this paper obviously depends quite heavily. See,
e.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME

COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970) [hereinafter cited as A. BICKEL, THE
SUPREME COURT]; A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOV-

ERNMENT (1976); R. DwORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); Sandalow, Judicial
Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1162 (1977); Tribe, Structural Due Proc-

ess, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269 (1975); Wellington, Common Law Rules and
Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221
(1973).
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of a difference the Nixon appointees have made. Several Warren
Court members have also expressed reservations about court intervention in class-struggle cases. Warren and Black, for example,
were prepared in dissent to uphold the welfare-residency requirement in Shapiro, 62 the precursor to the Burger Court cases. Moreover, Stewart and White have usually joined with the Nixon appointees in declining to intervene. 63
It is obviously impossible to say how justices no longer on the
Court, or justices appointed by a more liberal president than
Nixon, would have voted. The telling point is, however, that even
with different personnel only some of the class-struggle cases of the
1970's would have gone the other way, and at that by rather slim
margins. Nowhere near the Warren Court's unanimity on the segregation issue would have been achieved. 64 That fact is significant
because a unified Court is important for gaining public acceptance
of major decisions, and because it suggests that fundamental questions about the role of the Court were at stake in those cases.
At stake were issues of the legitimacy and competency of the
Court to handle class-struggle cases, and of the Court's responsiveness to the public mood in ways more subtle than the appointive process. Because the legislature, being directly responsible to the electorate, is more likely to permit collective concerns to
override individual rights, the Court has evolved in our society
into the institution primarily charged with protecting individual
rights. Although short-term political considerations can impact the
Court through the appointive process, the fact that appointments
are for life insulates the Court to a degree not the case for legislators. That once appointed the justices are insulated, however, does
not mean there are no pressures to be responsive to popular will.
The threat of impeachment, though remote, may be enough to
temper decisions likely to contradict public opinion. More importantly, the Court must rely heavily on moral suasion to gain acceptance of and compliance with its decisions. To the extent that its decisions are extremely unpopular, the Court's prestige and moral
suasion are undercut. In protecting preferred individual rights the
Court has played and should play a leadership role, but it is realis62. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
63. Stewart joined the majority in all of Rodriguez, Dandridge, Milliken,
Pasadena,Warth, Valtierra, and Arlington Heights, while White joined the majority
in all but Rodriguez and Milliken.
64. Brown, Brown II, Griffin, Green, and most if not all the other Warren
Court segregation decisions were unanimous opinions.
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tic to expect the Court to pull back when it encounters massive resistance to its decisions lest it risk loss of public confidence in itself
as an institution.
Retreat in the face of resistance is definitely a factor underlying the Court's recent decisions and is an outgrowth of the public's
response to the Court's handling of the desegregation cases. During the early part of the civil rights era it was basically the South
against the rest of the country. Explicitly mandated segregation existed only in the South, and the civil rights movement made a convincing and demonstrative case of its immorality.6 5 Far from going
counter to public opinion, the Court's initial segregation decisions,
though resisted in the South, were supported by large numbers
of people if viewed from a national perspective. But the mood
changed as it became apparent that laws mandating segregation
were only the tip of the iceberg, that the depressed conditions and
segregation rampant in the South were also present throughout the
country, and that remedying these evils would intimately affect all
our lives. The rest of the country could no longer feel morally superior, and the defensiveness and resistance which marked the
southern response spread.
White resistance was accompanied by an attitudinal change
within the black community as well. At the start of the civil rights
era the prevailing view in the black community, at least the view
espoused by black leaders, was integrationist. Integration was seen
as the principal means of bringing black people into the
mainstream of American life and almost as an end in itself.6 6 As
the movement progressed, however, many black leaders began to
advocate community control over the institutions which affect black
people's lives and destinies. 67 It is no longer so clear that integration is the desired goal.
65.

For discussions of the history of the

civil rights movement, see L.

BENNETT, JR., BEFORE THE MAYFLOWER: A HISTORY OF THE NEGRO IN AMEIPjcA

1619-1964, at 307-55 (Penguin ed. 1966); J. FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM:

A HISTORY OF NEGRO AMERICANS 450-98 (5th ed. 1980).
66. See Galamison, Integration Must Work-Nothing Else Can, in THE VOICE
OF BLACK AMERICA 959 (P. Foner ed. 1972); King, I Have a Dream, in THE VOICE
OF BLACK AMERICA 971 (P. Foner ed. 1972); Marshall, Segregation and Desegregation, in THE VOICE OF BLACK AMERICA 866 (P. Foner ed. 1972).
67. See, e.g., S. CARMICHAEL & C. HAMILTON, BLACK POWER, THE POLITICS
OF LIBERATION IN AMERICA (1967); CONFRONTATION AT OCEANHILL-BROWNSVILLE

(M. Berube & M. Gittell eds. 1969); Lester, The Necessity for Separation, EBONY,
Aug. 1970, at 166, 166-69. Ironically, the community-control concept is not dissimilar
to the "states' rights" doctrine advanced by southern states during the civil rights era
as an argument against Federal intervention with respect to racial discrimination.
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It is inconceivable that the Supreme Court would remain unaffected by this shift in public opinion. Nor does the public's conservative mood appear to have abated. In fact, faced with concurrent threats of inflation and recession, we are seeing a new
inner-directedness, with people so concerned with protecting their
own well-being that they have less occasion to address the inequities which still exist in our society.68 The public's mood goes a
long way toward explaining why at least some members of the
Court were willing to draw the line on desegregation in Milliken
and Pasadena and have been unwilling to intervene at all in such
class-struggle cases as Rodriguez, Dandridge, Valtierra, and
Arlington Heights.
Public resistance has a further dimension because of the remedial problems raised by many of the recent decisions. It is one
thing, for example, to decide that school segregation or school
financing or welfare administration or exclusionary zoning is unconstitutional. It is quite another to bring about school desegregation, fair methods of school financing, adequate welfare benefits, or housing integration. The history of the school-desegregation
cases after Brown is replete with remedial difficulties, also present
in class-struggle cases, which contribute to the Burger Court's retrenchment in school desegregation and unwillingness to enter the
class-struggle arena.
Having decided to intervene in Brown, the Supreme Court
was faced with two alternatives. It could declare mandatory segregation unconstitutional and leave the remedy to local authorities,
or it could thrust the courts into the position of overseeing
desegregation. Given the integrationist philosophy of the times and
the likelihood of local resistance to the decision, it is understandable why the Court eventually chose the latter course.
The Court's first recognition of remedial problems, likely resistance, and the need to respond to political realities was in
Brown 11,69 in which the Court established the "all deliberate
speed" formula for desegregation.7" The Court could have ordered
immediate desegregation. Its decision not to do so must have reflected a preference for locally developed rather than court68.

See C. LAsCH, THE CULTURE OF NARCISSISM (1979); R. RINGER, LOOKING

OUT FOR #1 (1977).
69. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
70. Id. at 301.
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mandated solutions, as well as a judgment that a more gradual implementation of desegregation might lessen white resistance.
That notion proved largely unfounded as southern states took
action to avoid the Brown decisions. One approach was to close the
public schools (or give localities the option of closing them) and/or
to substitute tuition-grant programs under which students attending private schools, which at that time could discriminate
based on race, 71 would receive money from the state to apply
toward their private school education. Absent a racially discriminatory purpose there is no constitutional compulsion to operate public schools, nor any proscription against tuition-grant and localoption plans. However, since the obvious purpose was to thwart
Brown and maintain a segregated system, the Court struck down
72
these avoidance tactics in Griffin v. County School Board.
But that hardly stopped the resistance. If government could
not be used directly to circumvent Brown, resisters might be able
to do so on their own through freedom-of-choice or neighborhoodschool approaches. Under freedom-of-choice parents had the right
to select their children's schools. Whites would obviously select
previously all-white schools. Blacks could also select white schools,
but pressure from the white community, as well as a hesitancy resulting from years of forced segregation, might well induce them to
select previously all-black schools. That proved to be the case in
Green v. County School Board73 and led the Court to strike down
freedom-of-choice. Under the neighborhood-school approach children would be assigned to the schools closest to their homes.
Given the highly segregated housing patterns in most communities, school authorities could then draw perfectly rational schoolattendance lines and still maintain largely segregated schools. The
Supreme Court's response was Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Board of Education,74 in which the Court sanctioned busing as a
desegregation remedy. Again, absent racial overtones there is nothing constitutionally offensive about freedom-of-choice and neighborhood schools. Implicit, therefore, in Green and Swann is the
notion that these ostensibly legitimate approaches are, in the context of a history of racial segregation and a pattern of residential
segregation, every bit as much avoidance tactics for which the state
71.
72.

See note 80 infra.
377 U.S. 218 (1964).

73. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
74.

402 U.S. 1 (1971).
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is chargeable as are those in Griffin; or the notion that where a
segregated system has existed there is an obligation to find a means
to integrate it as proof positive that the previous system has been
abandoned.
The response was more resistance-the issue now having
spread throughout the nation 7 5 -in the form of federal legislation
limiting busing, 76 proposed constitutional amendments prohibiting
busing, 77 and white flight to the suburbs or private schools, leaving
many central-city schools so heavily minority that integration became an impossibility. 78 Soon thereafter the Nixon appointees
joined the Court and in Milliken and Pasadena the
Court pulled
79
back from its earlier commitment to desegregation.
75. In Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 413 U.S. 189 (1973), the
Court held Brown applicable to school districts in which segregation exists and is attributable to state action, despite the fact that a statutorily mandated school system
does not exist. As subsequent litigation has disclosed, a great many school districts
throughout the country have engaged in segregative practices. See notes 37-43 supra
and accompanying text.
76. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1713-1714 (1974); see G. GUNTHER, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 328-30 (2d ed. 1976); id. at 119-20 (Supp. 1979).
77. H.R.J. Res. 623, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1979); G. GUNTHER, supra note 76, at
119-20 (Supp. 1979).
78. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). The extent to which schooldesegregation plans themselves induce white flight has been debated. See sources
cited in note 44 supra. There can be little doubt, though, that the immigration of
blacks into our central cities has been a substantial contributing factor to the white
exodus. See Pettigrew, Attitudes on Race and Housing, in SEGREGATION IN RESIDENTIAL AREAS 21 (A. Hawley & V. Rock eds. 1973); Rose, Social Processes in the
City: Race and Urban Residential Choice, in HOUSING IN AMERICA: PROBLEMS AND
PERSPECTIVES 368, 372-76 (D. Mandelker & R. Montgomery eds. 1973).
79. See text accompanying notes 37-44 supra. Not to be discounted as well, as a
factor perhaps influencing the Court's retreat, is the recently developed socialscience data questioning whether integrated education is of significant benefit to
blacks in terms of educational achievement, self image, or improving race relations.
As might be expected, the data present a mixed bag, some researchers concluding
the integration is beneficial, others that it is not, and still others that it does not matter either way. See, e.g., Cohen, The Effects of Desegregation on Race Relations, 39
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB., Spring 1975, at 271; Crain & Mahard, Desegregation and
Black Achievement: A Review of the Research, 42 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB., Summer
1978, at 17; Epps, The Impact of School Desegregation on Aspirations, SelfConcepts and Other Aspects of Personality, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB., Spring
1975, at 300; Epps, The Impact of School Desegregation on the Self-Evaluation and
Achievement Orientation of Minority Children, 42 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB., Summer 1978, at 57; Hawley, The New Mythology of School Desegregation, 42 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB., Autumn 1978, at 214; McConahay, The Effects of School Desegregation upon Students' Racial Attitudes and Behavior: A CriticalReview of the Literature and a Prolegomenon to FurtherResearch, 42 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB., Summer
1978, at 77; Weinberg, The RelationshipBetween School DesegregationandAcademic
Achievement: A Review of the Research, 39 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB., Spring 1975,
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Had Milliken in particular gone the other way and suburbs
been required to participate in desegregation plans, whites desirous of avoiding integration could have found still other avoidance
techniques. One which suggests itself is the private school alter-

native. Many suburban middle- and upper-income whites might
well have abandoned public education for private schools which, al-

though they cannot now discriminate, 80 would have few minorities

because of their cost. Thus, though public school systems might be

integrated, they would serve predominantly lower-income people
and probably at woefully inadequate funding levels, since the departed middle-class taxpayers would have every incentive to keep
public school finances as low as possible.
The upshot is that once the Court decided to become involved

in a complex remedial process, it found a resistant public able to
devise avoidance tactics to thwart each successive Court decision.
Moreover, as resistance spread nationwide, and as it became apparent that many in the black community itself questioned the desirability of integration, the Court's political support for the Brown

decision declined dramatically. This undoubtedly helps explain the
limits the Court has placed on its desegregation efforts.,,

The class-struggle cases-school finance, welfare rights, and
exclusionary zoning-pose remedial problems which are at least as

difficult as those posed by school desegregation and which likewise
contribute to the Burger Court's reluctance to intervene. The
Rodriguez case is a good illustration.8 2 If as a result of whitemiddle-class flight central cities are left with poorer tax bases than
the suburbs, 8 3 the obvious remedy would be some form of

statewide school financing to equalize monies available to local
at 241. That is in sharp contrast, however, with the prevailing integrationist perspective early on in the civil rights era.
80. Runyon v. McCarry, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), held the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
14 Stat. 27 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970)), which prohibits racial discrimination in the making of private contracts, applicable to private, commercially operated,
nonsectarian schools which offer their services to the general public.
81. In what could be viewed as an attempt to accommodate white resistance to
integration and black demands for quality education, the Court in Milliken v.
Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Milliken II], upheld as part of a
desegregation order a requirement of compensatory and remedial education programs for children subjected to segregation. Id. at 279-88. But where is the money to
come from if as the result of white flight, induced in part by the Court's own decisions, see note 44 supra, the district's ability to finance education has deteriorated,
and if the Court is unwilling per Rodriguez to address the fiscal-disparity issue?
82. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
83.

See note 26 supra.
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districts-in effect some form of wealth redistribution. How this
might come about is demonstrated by the following oversimplified
example. Assume a state with only two school districts, both having
equal numbers of pupils but with District One having a tax base of
$40,000 per pupil and District Two a tax base of $20,000 per pupil.
Assume also a tax rate of 5% in each district so that District One
has $2,000 per pupil to spend while District Two has only $1,000.
The situation could be equalized by having the state impose and
collect a 5% statewide tax and disburse $1,500 to each district, thus
redistributing $500 per pupil from District One to District Two.
But let us further assume that the middle-class people living
in District One do not want their educational program diluted by
$500 per pupil and have the political power to force the state to
develop a scheme which assures them continuation of their $2,000
per pupil. The state would have to "level up" by providing an additional $1,000 per pupil for District Two, in effect spending more
money on education than had previously been spent on a statewide basis. The additional money could be raised by increasing the
tax rate in both districts to roughly 6.6%, or by some other new
tax program which would make all taxpayers, including the
hardpressed poor in District Two, pay more taxes. If new taxes
were politically unpalatable, the state could redistribute funds from
other state-financed programs into education (or forego increases it
would otherwise make in such programs). In an era of taxpayer revolt this latter solution seems most likely. In that case, other
welfare-type programs which redistribute wealth to the poor might
well be the area from which funds are diverted. Unless the Court
were then willing to take on the welfare-adequacy issue, the impact would be to elevate education to a higher priority than other
redistributional programs benefiting the poor-itself a complex policy judgment.
Although the welfare-rights and exclusionary-zoning cases raise
political and remedial difficulties similar to Brown and Rodriguez, 8 4 a strong argument can still be made for Supreme Court intervention in the class struggle. Nonetheless, the Burger Court's
class-struggle decisions indicate a judicial conviction that wealth redistribution is a policy issue which should be resolved by the political process, and that court intervention is inappropriate because of
likely public resistance and remedial constraints. 85 These issues re84. See text accompanying notes 187-220 infra.
85.

As cases like Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), and Milliken II, 433
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quire a more thorough examination than the Burger Court has thus
far given them.
A ROLE FOR THE COURTTBE EQUAL PROTECTION ARGUMENT

There is no paucity of legal doctrine on which the Burger
Court might have relied had it chosen to enter the class struggle.
Equal protection is the obvious candidate. Over the years, equal
protection analysis has evolved into two distinct approaches.
Where discrimination regarding a suspect class or fundamental
right is involved, strict scrutiny is invoked and the burden is on
the government to demonstrate a compelling interest justifying the
discriminatory treatment. If, on the other hand, no suspect class or
fundamental right is involved, minimum rationality is the test and
all the government must demonstrate is some rational basis or legitimate purpose justifying its action. 8 6 Since under strict scrutiny
the government usually loses and under minimum rationality the
government usually wins, a third line of cases has begun to
emerge-so-called middle scrutiny which allows the Court greater
flexibility in weighing the competing claims of individuals and gov88
ernment. 8 7 Sex-discrimination cases fall into this category.
The purpose of this three-tiered approach is to permit the
Court to afford special protection in the political process to constitutionally preferred interests, while simultaneously giving appropriate deference to legislative determinations. The classic suspect
class, of course, is black people. In light of the purpose of the fourteenth amendment to protect blacks and of the historical bias
against them, it makes sense when blacks are singled out for disparate treatment to suspect bias and thus to demand a strong showU.S. 267 (1977), demonstrate, however, the Burger Court has not been averse to
issuing decisions which may entail substantial expenditure of government money
and which may thus raise remedial issues similar to those in Rodriguez and the other
class-struggle cases. See notes 36 and 81 supra. Indeed both Goldberg and Milliken

11 can be viewed as class-struggle cases, and the Court's willingness to intervene
there but not in other cases begs a theory explaining when judicial intervention is
and is not called for.
86.

For a general discussion of the strict-scrutiny and minimum-rationality ap-

proaches, see L. TRIBE, supra note 12, §§ 16-1 to -2, 16-5 to -7. Racial and ancestral
minorities are the classic suspect classes. See id. §§ 16-14 to -17. Interstate travel,
voting, and access to the criminal process have been identified as fundamental
rights. See id. §§ 16-8 to -10, 16-36 to -40.
87. For a discussion of the middle-scrutiny approach, see id. §§ 16-30 to -31.
88. See id. §§ 16-25 to -27. In Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), four
members of the Court were prepared to treat women as a suspect class and employ
strict-scrutiny review, though as yet a majority has not been willing to do so.
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ing of justification from the government. The strict-scrutiny test requires such a showing and is consistent with the approach used by
the Court to protect other preferred values. 89 If, however, no
preferred interest is involved, there is no reason for special protection, and the Court defers to the greater public responsiveness and
expertise of legislative bodies when weighing the importance of
competing concerns. The minimum-rationality test so defers and is
consistent with the approach the Court generally applies for like
reasons in substantive due process cases. 90 In developing the
middle-scrutiny approach in sex-discrimination cases, the Court has
adjudged women deserving of greater protection than minimum rationality affords, but less than that given to blacks under strict
scrutiny.
In class-struggle cases the Court could easily label the poor a
suspect class or the interests involved fundamental rights, and then
invoke whichever of the strict- or middle-scrutiny tests appears
more appropriate. 9 1 The Warren Court did just that in Shapiro v.
Thompson, 9 2 the durational-residency welfare-rights case, treating
indigent newcomers as a suspect class and the right to travel as a
fundamental right, and then employing strict scrutiny. But the
Burger Court quickly retreated in Dandridge,93 Valtierra,94 and
Rodriguez. In Dandridge it declined to find large indigent families
a suspect class and (at least inferentially) welfare to be a fundamental right. 95 However, the Court did not explain the distinctions
between newcomers and large families on the one hand, nor the
right to travel and welfare on the other. In Valtierra the Court was
unwilling to find potential recipients of low-income housing a sus96
pect class or housing (at least inferentially) a fundamental right.
Again it failed to explain the distinctions.
89. See L. TRIBE, supra note 12, §§ 12-8 to -9 (free speech); id.

§§ 13-1 to -21

§ 14-10 (free exercise of religion).
90. See id. § 8-7. The Court does employ heightened scrutiny in the sub-

(voting rights); id.

stantive due process area with respect to interests which it deems worthy of special
protection-most notably the right of privacy. See id. § 15-1. Sometimes the Court
seems to invoke strict scrutiny in these cases, at other times middle scrutiny, depending evidently on its view of the importance of the competing interests involved.
91. Generally speaking, middle scrutiny would seem to be the appropriate approach in class-struggle cases. See note 186 infra and text accompanying notes 126186 infra.
92. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
93. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
94. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
95. 397 U.S. at 483-87.
96. 402 U.S. at 142. The Court has since specifically held housing not to be a
fundamental right. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 73-74 (1972).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol9/iss3/3

22

Kleven: The Supreme Court, Race, and the Class Struggle
SUPREME COURT AND CLASS STRUGGLE

The Court did attempt to distinguish its Rodriguez holding
from Shapiro, though its argument is far from convincing. While
not saying that the poor can never be viewed as a suspect class, it
said that on the Rodriguez facts the poor had not been singled out
for disparate treatment because there was no correlation between
school-district wealth (in terms of property values) and poor people. 97 The data did support the Court's conclusion if viewed from
the perspective of school districts with per-pupil property values
less than $100,000. In fact, there was an inverse relationship between district wealth and median family income for districts with
per-pupil property values between $10,000 and $100,000, that is,
the poorer the district the higher the median family income. 98 The
inference, of course, is that any redistribution under those circumstances from richer to poorer districts would actually hurt the poor.
But if viewed from the perspective of the very poorest school districts, those with per-pupil property values less than $10,000, there
was a correlation between district wealth and poor people. Median
family income in those districts, as well as school expenditures per
pupil, was far below that of the richer districts. 9 9 The relatively
small size of the class would, if anything, strengthen the case for
affording suspect-class treatment, yet the Court gave no explanation for its unwillingness to do so.
In Rodriguez the Court also declined to find education a fundamental right, distinguishing earlier fundamental-right cases on
the ground that only those rights found explicitly or implicitly in
the Constitution are fundamental.' 00 But the right to vote in state
elections' 0 ' and the right to travel' 02 are not explicitly stated in the
Constitution; nor for that matter is the right of privacy which the
Burger Court has recognized and extended. 10 3 The Court, however, failed to explain what makes those rights implicit while education is not.

97. 411 U.S. at 22-28.
98. See id. at 15 n.38.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 33-34.
101. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
102. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
103. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (upholding statutory scheme for
maintaining computerized records of prescriptions for dangerous but lawful drugs,
while recognizing individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters); Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (limiting government's right to regulate abortions);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (invalidating regulation making contraceptives less available to unmarried than to married couples).
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The Court's opinions in the class-struggle line of cases provide
little insight as to why strict scrutiny is appropriate for blacks and
middle scrutiny is appropriate for women, while neither is accorded the poor. Nor do they provide insight into the process and
principles by which the Court discovers fundamental rights implicit
in the Constitution. Yet should the Court eventually decide to intervene on behalf of the poor, it will have to articulate some theory
to defend itself against the charge that it is acting as a superlegislature, imposing its will on the public in an undemocratic fashion. The question is: Can Court intervention be justified, or is it, as
10 4
Professor Winter believes, "absolutely wrong?"
Individual Rights and the Class Struggle
Our society values majority rule and the making of policy decisions by representatives directly responsible to the people. It does
not inexorably follow, however, that adherence to those concepts
will produce a just society. In particular, a major threat in a democratic system is that the majority will tread on another strongly
held value: individual rights. Thus the Bill of Rights protects individuals by creating certain preferred rights which are supposed to
outweigh short-term majoritarian considerations.
Due to its insulation from day-to-day politics, it is appropriate
that the role of protecting preferred individual rights should have
fallen on the Supreme Court. Most commentators, even those who
advocate judicial restraint, believe the framers of the Constitution
intended the Court to play that role, and to have the power to
05
overturn governmental acts that infringe the preferred rights.'
Still lively is the debate as to whether the Court, in protecting
individual rights, should stick to the originally intended meaning of
the constitutional provisions to the extent discoverable, or should
allow their meaning to evolve as times change. 10 I profess faith in
the latter view. If held to the original understanding, the Court
would be prevented from helping society solve current problems

104. Winter, supra note 9, at 43.
105. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 61, at 15; R.
BURGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 351-62 (1977).
106. Professor Burger adheres to the former view. See R. BURGER, supra note
105, at 363-72. Professor Cox would seem to be an adherent of the evolutionary approach. See A. Cox, supra note 61; A. Cox, THE WARREN COURT (1968). For a
discussion of the difficulty of ascertaining the original intent, see Ely, Constitutional
Interpretivism:Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399 (1978).
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which were not anticipated in an earlier age or which earlier society was not ready to address. For example, in light of widespread
segregation throughout the nation at the time of and after the
adoption of the fourteenth amendment, it can be argued that the
framers of the equal protection clause never intended to outlaw the
practice.' 0 7 But to turn back the clock and uphold school segregation in Brown would be horrendous. By 1954 the idea had come of
age. The only questions were how long would desegregation take,
and how much would society be torn apart in the process. Surely
the Supreme Court helped promote public acceptance of the idea,
if not the practice. The civil rights era was violent, but would
likely have been more so without the Court's steadying influence
and moral leadership.
This is not to say, however, that the Court can or should arbitrarily decide what is best for the country. As a judicial body it
must rely on the willingness of the more politically responsive
branches to carry out its rulings. Consequently, it must rely ultimately on its ability to persuade the public of the rightness of its
decisions. To do so, the Court must base its decisions on principles
the public is prepared to accept, if somewhat begrudgingly. Principles which can be found at least implicitly in the Constitution are
much more likely to gain acceptance than principles which are
thought to originate in some judge's head. While judges obviously
do decide cases in accordance with their own predilections,
requiring them to rationalize their decisions according to constitu107. Compare R. BURGER, supra note 105, at 117-33 with Bickel, The Original
Understandingand the Segregation Decision, 69 HARv. L. REv. 1, 56-65 (1955). The
question of the originally intended meaning of the equal protection clause can be addressed on more than one level. On a nonabstract level, one might attempt to discover the specific fact situations to which the clause was meant to apply. If the intended coverage were uncertain in a specific case, one might try to develop an
abstract principle which explains known cases and against which the uncertain case
could be tested. In light of the obvious purpose of protecting blacks, a plausible abstraction underlying equal protection is that individuals are not to be disadvantaged
because of their race. It is conceivable that the framers of the fourteenth amendment
adhered to this abstract concept but did not believe it violated by enforced segregation. (Or were they just unwilling to abide by their own principle?) However, now
that social science and moral thinking have developed to the point that enforced segregation is widely viewed as disadvantageous to blacks, adherence to the original understanding on both levels would produce an irreconcilable conflict. At a minimum,
allowing evolution in the meaning of equal protection on the nonabstract level is
consistent with continued adherence to the originally intended general principle
against racial discrimination. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 61, at 93, 134-36 (genesis
of this argument). For a discussion of an even more abstract conception of equal protection in the context of the class struggle, see note 110 infra and accompanying text.
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tional principles is some safeguard against their wandering too far

afield.
Thus, if the Constitution specifically exempted segregation
from the operation of the fourteenth amendment, the Court would
have no choice but to go along. But the fourteenth amendment
speaks in general terms-denial of equal protection-and that concept has room to grow in accordance with evolving notions of what
equality means. Perhaps separate but equal satisfied post-Civil War

notions of equality, but it did not suffice in 1954, at least not on a
nationwide basis. 108

Moreover, because the Court is the final arbiter and because
its decisions are based on the Constitution, a Court ruling carries

great moral weight. When the Court rules, it says that a governmental action does or does not conform with our most fundamental
ideals. So to have upheld segregation in Brown would have put a
moral stamp of approval on a practice which is obviously unjust,
even to those favoring the original-understanding approach to con-

stitutional construction. 109 Court inaction could only have made
the transition to a nonsegregated society all the more difficult and

108. I am advocating a "living law" approach to constitutional decisionmaking.
A court's rulings should reflect the times in terms of such social factors as the role
society wishes courts to play, the mores of society as evidenced by the principles
people espouse as well as live by, and the social implications of judicial rulings.
That does not mean a court is merely to discern and implement majority will. It may
be assigned an antimajoritarian function in some cases, as in the protection of individual rights. Moreover, the principles people actually live by may be inconsistent
with the higher ideals which they espouse and of which they wish courts to remind
them periodically. It does mean, however, that the public mood is relevant to how
far a court can go in articulating and effectuating new principles. Also relevant is empirical data concerning the contexts out of which cases arise and the consequences of
their resolution. Underlying many, if not most, court decisions are empirical judgments (often unstated) regarding human behavior and social dynamics. Examining
available empirical data can help courts avoid making incorrect judgments and at a
minimum will force them to articulate the behavioral assumptions underlying their
decisions. All too often, as I shall attempt to demonstrate, the Burger Court has been
remiss in articulating its assumptions in class-struggle cases. See note 115 and text
accompanying notes 152-186 infra. For general discussions on the living-law approach, see Littlefield, Eugen Ehrlich's Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of
Law, 19 ME. L. REV. 1 (1967); O'Day, Ehrlich'sLiving Law Revisited-FurtherVindications for a Prophet Without Honor, 18 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 210 (1966). For
discussions of the relevancy of social-science data to judicial decisionmaking, see
Dworkin, Social Sciences and Constitutional Rights-The Consequences of Uncertainty, in EDUCATION, SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 19 (R. Rist & R.

Anson eds. 1976); Yudof, School Desegregation: Legal Realism, Reasoned Elaboration, and Social Science Research in the Supreme Court, 42 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROB., Autumn 1978, at 57.
109. R. BURGER, supra note 105, at 407, 412-13.
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disruptive. In addition, it would have undercut public respect for
the Court and consequently the Court's ability to operate in areas
which even strict constructionists recognize as legitimate.
I have yet to explicate the underlying constitutional principle
that explains why mandatory segregation is obviously unjust, and it
is necessary to do so in order to explore the use of equal protection
in the class struggle. Segregation is unjust because it offends human dignity by imposing a badge of inferiority akin to that of slavery. Whatever specific acts the framers of the fourteenth amendment sought to prohibit, they all related to elemental human
dignity. If there is any candidate for a universally held moral principle underlying the concept of equal protection, it must be that
every human being is as equally worthy as a human being as every
other human being. 1 10 That may be a somewhat nebulous concept,
but it is clearly violated by enforced segregation based on race
alone. "I
Other factors related to human dignity support the protective
treatment accorded blacks by the Supreme Court under the equal
protection clause. Blacks have historically been subjected to discriminatory treatment; skin color is a permanent and involuntary
feature which permits no ability to opt out; to disadvantage someone solely because of race is morally repugnant; race is irrelevant
as a means of determining an individual's competence; and being a
numerical minority makes it difficult to rectify injustices through
the political process. 112 Since these factors have also been present

110. Other writers have advanced essentially the same concept in different
terms. Professor Dworkin calls it the right to "treatment as an equal." R. DWORKIN,
supra note 61, at 227. Professor Baker calls it the right to "equality of respect."
Baker, Neutrality, Process, and Rationality: Flawed Interpretationsof Equal Protection, 58 TEX. L. REV. 1029, 1030-31 (1980). The concept of human dignity is an even
higher level of abstraction than the principle against racial discrimination. See note
107 supra. It would not be possible to adhere to the principle against racial discrimination without also adhering to the human-dignity concept. I therefore view the extension of the equal protection clause to class-struggle cases in the name of human
dignity as still complying with the original understanding of the framers on its most
abstract level. My purpose in this Article is to justify that extension by showing the
close analogy between racial discrimination and the class struggle.

111. The right-of-privacy cases, see note 90 supra, could also be said to flow
from some notion of the importance of personal privacy to human dignity. So too

could the cases according criminal defendants what might be called a principle of
fair access to the judicial process be said to relate to preserving human dignity. See
L. TRIBE, supra note 12, §§ 16-36 to -38.

112.

Indeed, blacks were denied access altogether to the political process. See

D. BELL, JR., RACE, RACiSMI AND AMERICAN LAW 126-48 (1980). Also relevant as a
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to some degree with respect to other ethnic minorities, it is understandable why the Court has also accorded them protective treatment. 113 As for women, some of the factors are clearly present,
others less so. For example, although women have been treated as
second-class citizens, due to their greater numbers they arguably
have greater opportunity to rectify injustices through the political
process. Perhaps that explains why the Court has been unwilling to
label women a suspect class, but has subjected governmental actions treating women differently to so-called middle scrutiny.
Human dignity is at stake in the class struggle as well. Admittedly, the mere fact that someone is poorer than someone else, or
even very poor, does not necessarily indicate a breach of human
dignity. An individual might, for instance, consciously choose poverty, abjuring the benefits of modern life; another might be unwilling to work hard though well-educated and physically able. The
poorness of such individuals, without more, would not offend the
sensibilities of most people in a society which values freedom of
choice and economic incentives as an inducement to productivity.
But were a person destitute for reasons beyond his or her control, most people's sensibilities probably would be offended if society did nothing to help. It is therefore relevant to inquire about
poor people's ability to opt out. While a black person or a woman
cannot change race or sex, arguably a poor person can change status by earning more money; and there obviously are instances
where people work their way out of poverty or slide up and down
the scale of relative affluence or deprivation. A related argument is
that while race or sex is ordinarily viewed as an invalid basis for
judging someone's moral worthiness or competence, poverty can
result from lack of effort. Thus nonaccess to a good because of inability to pay can be rationalized as ethically sound.
buttress to the Court's decision to strike down enforced segregation was the socialscience data (relied on in Brown, for example) suggesting that segregation was psychologically damaging to black people. See note 108 supra. Though that issue may
now seem more debatable, see note 79 supra, it was the best available data at the
time and tended to point in the same direction as the other social factors supporting
the decision. The current uncertainty may help explain the Burger Court's
unwillingness to espouse integrationism as strongly as the Warren Court seemed to
do and might even justify the Burger Court's stance to some degree were it prepared
to deal with the financing issue in cases like Rodriguez.
113. See, e.g., Hemandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (Mexican-Americans as
suspect class); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (Chinese as suspect class);
cf. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682-88 (1973) (Justice Brennan's argument
for treating women as suspect class).
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The weight of the incentive argument depends on the degree
of mobility that poor people have in our society. To the extent that
during an individual's lifetime, or from one generation to the next,
there is substantial mobility into and out of low-income status, the

case for court protection is weaker. However, to the extent that we
have a permanent underclass relegated to low-income status gener-

ation after generation, there is little ability to opt out; and the implication is, or ought to be, that low-income status is often beyond

the control of the poor, and is not a function of lack of incentive or
merit but of the way the system is organized or operated. Particularly for the poorest of the poor, and more particularly for poor
who are also racial minorities, a strong case can be made that we
do have a permanent underclass, or that at a minimum there are
substantial structural obstacles to mobility which inhibit their life
chances. 1 14 There is thus a close parallel between racial minorities
114. There have been only a few empirically rigorous mobility studies, and as
with most sociological issues the data are subject to conflicting interpretations. No society, of course, is perfectly mobile or immobile, so the question of the rigidity of the
class structure is one of degree. S. Lipset and R. Bendix in their classic study of occupational mobility lent support to the cycle-of-poverty theory by concluding that:
Occupational and social status are to an important extent self-perpetuating. They are associated with many factors which make it difficult for
individuals to modify their status. Position in the social structure is usually
associated with a certain level of income, education, family structure, community reputation, and so forth. These become part of a vicious circle in
which each factor acts on the other in such a way as to preserve the social
structure in its present form as well as the individual family's position in
that structure.
S. LIPSET & R. BENDIX, SOCIAL MOBILITY IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 198 (1959). In
what is generally regarded as the most comprehensive study of its kind, P. BLAU &
0. DUNCAN, THE AMERICAN OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE (1967), the authors quarreled with Lipset's and Bendix's conclusion with such statements as:
[The] relationship of background factors and status of origin to subsequent
achievement . . . is not trivial, nor is it, on the other hand, great enough to
justify the conception of a system that insures the "inheritance of poverty"
or otherwise renders wholly ineffectual the operation of institutions supposedly based on universalistic principles.
Id. at 203.
But Blau and Duncan's study itself still lends substantial support to the notion that
the poor, and especially the poorest of the poor, face substantial structural obstacles
to mobility with such findings as that "the working class has poorer chances of
upward mobility than the middle class," id. at 423; that "[t~he highest white-collar
strata and the lowest strata of unskilled workers and farm workers are less varied in
social origin than the intermediate occupational groups," id. at 77; and that the four
factors of father's occupation, father's education, individual's education, and individual's first job (the latter two of which are themselves dependent on social origin) explain "somewhat less than half" of an individual's occupational achievement. Id. at
402-03. Moreover, the upward mobility found in the study may well reflect an abso-
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and at least the poorest of the poor in terms of the reasons for affording suspect-class treatment under the equal protection clause.
The Burger Court has been too quick to overlook this parallel.115
Moreover, the very poor comprise only a small segment of the
population, so access to the political process is not likely to be a viable alternative to rigorous judicial protection. In addition, the
very poor are likely to have less sophistication in using the political
process, to be less articulate in presenting their case, and to lack
the funds so necessary to an effective political appeal.' 1 6 Where
the Court finds that a fairly small low-income segment of the
populus is involved-whether it be migrant indigents, large indigent families, families eligible for low-income housing, or families
living in the poorest school districts-the case for heightened judicial scrutiny is therefore strong."17
lute improvement in status for those from lower origins in the social hierarchy, but
an improvement which still leaves them relatively lower than those from higher origins whose status may also have improved in an absolute sense. Support for that possibility flows from such findings as that while "[t]here is much upward mobility in
the United States, . . . most of it involves relatively short social distances," id. at 420;
and that "[tihe American occupational structure appears to be partitioned by two
semipermeable class boundaries [i.e., white collar/blue collar and blue collar/farm]
that limit downward mobility between generations as well as within lifetime careers,
though they permit upward mobility," id. at 59. Thus, for instance, while black people in America are better off in an absolute sense, the gap between blacks and
whites still remains. See notes 2-6 supra. Indeed, Blau and Duncan concluded that
"[tihe situation of the Negro American .. . exemplifies mechanisms inviting the label of a vicious circle." P. BLAU & 0. DUNCAN, supra, at 204.
115. The most recent example of the Burger Court's myopia in this regard is in
Harris v. McRae, 100 S. Ct. 2671 (1980), in which the Court upheld (by a 5-4 decision) the Hyde Amendment, Pub. L. No. 96-123, § 109, 93 Stat. 926 (1979), denying
federal funds for abortions under the Medicaid program, except where the mother's
life is threatened or in case of promptly reported rape or incest. The effect of tile decision will be to make it very difficult for indigent women to exercise their constitutional right to obtain an abortion, even when abortion is indicated for therapeutic
reasons. In declining to find governmental infringement of the constitutional right,
Justice Stewart wrote: "The financial constraints that restrict an indigent woman's
ability to enjoy the full range of constitutionally protected freedom of choice are the
product not of governmental restrictions on access to abortions, but rather of her indigency." 100 S. Ct. at 2688. The unstated assumption is that a woman is to blame
for her own indigency, and not the way society is structured. But if the Court feels
such facts are relevant (and it ought to), it should not simply assume their truth, but
should be willing to examine the empirical data which may well suggest the contrary. See note 114 supra.
116. That the exercise of effective political power is a function of class, and
that the lower classes, and particularly the poor, have less political power than the
better-off has been noted by many sociologists. See, e.g., D. JAMES, POVERTY, POLITICS AND CHANGE (1972); D. RosSIDES, supra note 7, at 323-94.
117. Compare Professor Fiss's approach of using the equal protection clause to
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The Fair-Opportunityand Fair-SharePrinciples
That poor people are deserving of judicial protection, however, does not tell us in what circumstances. Advocates of judicial

intervention frequently repair to the fundamental-rights doctrine as
a test for determining when intervention is appropriate. 11 8 But ab-

sent underlying principles consistent with contemporary notions of
the meaning of equal protection, it is impossible to say what are
and what are not fundamental rights, or what is the extent of society's obligation when a fundamental right is involved. If education is
a fundamental right, then are other governmental services? If not,

why not? Are food, clothing, and shelter fundamental rights? If so,
what quantity of these items must be provided?
While equal protection has something to do with human dignity, that concept is too abstract for direct application in concrete
class-struggle cases. There are, however, more specific principles
of equality, all derived from human dignity, from which a court

could choose if it saw fit. The succeeding pages will focus on four
such principles, none of which is original to me and all of which

can be found in American historical and philosophical writings. 119
The principles are equal rights, equal wealth, fair opportunity,

and fair share.
Equal rights.-The equal-rights principle requires that poor
people be accorded the same legal rights accorded others in soci-

ety. Class-struggle cases based on this principle are likely to be
protect "disadvantaged groups." Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 147-77 (1976). The poor may not strictly fall within his definition of a "group" as an entity with a "distinct existence apart from its members,"
and linked by "a condition of interdependence." Id. at 148. However, to a great degree they would (or at least the very poor would) seem to satisfy his criteria for affording other groups the kind of protective treatment that has been accorded
blacks-namely, "perpetual subordination and circumscribed political power." Id.

at 155.
118. See, e.g., Dienes, To Feed the Hungry: Judicial Retrenchment in Welfare
Adjudication, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 555, 593-600 (1970); Levy, The Supreme Court in
Retreat: Wealth Discriminationand Mr. Justice Marshall, 4 TEX. S.U.L. REV. 209,
230-35 (1976). Professor Michelman has even shown us that the fundamental right is
the key to the case, and not the suspectness of the class, since if the right is fundamental everyone is entitled to it. Michelman, supra note 9, at 22-23, 31. However, it
does still seem relevant to me to identify the poor as the class on whose behalf the
Court should intervene, since its willingness to intervene (even to vindicate fundamental rights) may depend on its perception of the ability of a group to obtain redress through the political process. See Fiss, supra note 117.
119. See, e.g., THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE; A. OKUN, EQUALITY AND
EFFICIENCY, THE BIG TRADEOFF (1975); J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 60-107

(1971); THE CONCEPT OF EQUALITY (W. Blackstone ed. 1969).
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rare, but if they were to arise (if, for example, a state or local government were to bar people with incomes below a certain level
from living there or from going to school), they would present classic equal protection situations closely analogous to racial discrimination and demanding a very strong showing of justification. The
denial of rights based on low-income status is the kind of disparate
treatment that suggests invidious motives and undercuts the ability to opt out which is at the heart of the rationale for affording
poor people protection under the equal protection clause. In those
instances the traditional suspect-class/strict-scrutiny/compellinginterest doctrine seems appropriate.
Edwards v. California,120 in which the Supreme Court struck
down (as a commerce clause violation rather than on equal protection grounds) a California law making it a crime to knowingly assist
an indigent person to enter the state, is close to an equal-rights
case. Although the statute did not forbid indigents themselves from
entering the state, it prevented indigents from obtaining the kind
of assistance which nonindigents could rightfully procure. Shapiro
v. Thompson 12 1 can also be analyzed as an equal-rights case. There
the Court employed strict-scrutiny review to prevent the government from denying the right to receive welfare to a discrete segment of its poor, that is, those in residence less than one year.
Most situations in which poor people claim unfair treatment
are not of this ilk, however. More typically the government is providing some service as a uniform fee which is charged to all, but
which because of their lower incomes poor people find harder to
afford. One could argue there is no unequal treatment since everyone has the right to the service and everyone pays the same
price.12 2 On the other hand, one could argue inequality in that the
poor must pay a higher percentage of their incomes for the service.
Which should control-the dollar amount or the percentage of in120. 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
121. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
122. Both the school-finance and exclusionary-zoning issues can be viewed as
service-access, as opposed to equal-rights, cases. With respect to schools, everyone
has the right to go to school, and residents of poor districts have the right to spend as
much per pupil as wealthy districts albeit by taxing themselves at a higher rate. An
analogy would be to the financing of public education on a pay-as-you-go basis with
all children charged the same tuition, thereby requiring poor families to pay out a
greater portion of their incomes than rich families. Similarly, the added cost of housing resulting from exclusionary zoning could be viewed as the fee to be paid for the
amenities available in suburbia. Everyone has the right to live there provided they
can afford the fee.
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come? To answer that question it is important to recognize that any
departure from a strict equal-rights/pay-as-you-go principle will demand some governmental redistribution of wealth, thus raising the
issue of when it is appropriate for a court to find wealth redistribution constitutionally compelled. The other three proposed principles-equal wealth, fair opportunity, fair share-speak to that issue.
Equal wealth.-The equal-wealth principle, raised here solely
for analytical purposes, represents the other end of the spectrum
from equal rights. Under an equal-wealth approach the government would be deemed responsible for any wealth disparities in
society and would be obligated to correct them. As farfetched as
the notion might seem, it is possible to construct an ethical argument for it-"to each according to his needs" may come close.123
An initial problem for equal wealth is the technical requirement of affirmative "state action" which has developed in equal
protection cases. 124 With respect to education and exclusionary
zoning there is no difficulty in finding state action. Yet many goods
which constitute items of wealth in our society are provided
through private market processes, and one's lack of those goods
could thus be said not to flow from governmental action. However,
as other commentators have shown, it would be easy for a court to
circumvent the state-action requirement. 125 Inaction can be regarded as action, for example, especially where there is a duty to
act. Furthermore, there is always governmental action in the sense
that the government has affirmatively established the economic system, and the rules governing it, which makes unequal distribution
of goods possible. At times, the government even executes policies
designed to decrease some people's ability to acquire goods, such
as raising the unemployment rate to combat inflation.
Nevertheless, equal wealth is obviously not a good candidate
for court adoption. It would be impossible for the government periodically to revalue all items of wealth owned by every individual
and to tax and redistribute wealth accordingly. Even if it were possible, the equal-wealth approach would produce such tremendous
disincentives to productivity for both those making and those
123. See also Winter, supra note 9, at 62-66.
124. See L. TRIBE, supra note 12, § 18-1 to -2.
125. See, e.g., Winter, supra note 9, at 44-45. Nevertheless, the state-action doctrine continues to have vitality before the Supreme Court. See Flagg Bros. v. Brooks,
436 U.S. 149 (1978).
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receiving redistribution payments that total societal wealth would
be diminished to a point where everyone was worse off. Most important, equal wealth is far from contemporary notions of equality
and could not begin to command public consensus.
Critical questions, therefore, are how strong a case can be
made for interpreting the equal protection clause to require that
the government at times redistribute wealth; and to the extent a
case can be made, when and how much redistribution is required?
The remaining two principles, fair opportunity and fair share, represent points somewhere between equal rights/pay-as-you-go and
equal wealth, and flow from ethical notions which make them worthy of judicial consideration.126
Fair opportunity and fair share.-Implicit in the concept of

fair opportunity is the notion that individuals born with similar innate capacities and drives should have comparable opportunities to
126. Both the fair-opportunity and fair-share principles derive from Rawls' second principle of justice which reads as follows: "Social and economic inequalities
are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair
equality of opportunity." J. RAWLS, supra note 119, at 83. The fair-share principle
may be no different from Professor Michelman's "just wants" concept; I have chosen
the fair-share label in order to contrast it with the fair-opportunity principle. See
Michelman, supra note 9, at 13-16. It is not my contention that the Constitution incorporates in toto the Rawlsian theory of justice any more than it totally incorporates
any other philosophical approach. I do think, however, that Rawls has advanced
principles which do underlie to one degree or another our democratic constitutional
system and which are therefore appropriate for judicial consideration in applying the
Constitution to contemporary problems. By the same token, there is a strong strain of
libertarianism in our society (in the sense of the right of an individual to live one's
life as one chooses, subject to everyone else's right to do the same). A libertarian
principle could easily be engrafted onto the due process clauses as a substantive prohibition against the government's depriving someone of liberty (the right-of-privacy
cases?), and at the most abstract level the framers of the clauses probably did understand them to flow from some such principle. Nozick has argued that libertarian principles demonstrate the injustice of a society's engaging in the kind of redistributional
efforts which the fair-opportunity and fair-share principles would mandate. R.
NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974). The task of our society, with the aid
of the courts I would argue, is somehow to balance these competing strains, neither
of which we have as yet seen fit to adopt in toto. Is it possible that these seemingly
inconsistent concepts can somehow be seen to fit into one overarching philosophy?
The concept of liberty also plays a prominent part in Rawls' philosophy, representing his first principle of justice-"[e]ach person is to have an equal right to the
most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system
of liberty for all"-which takes priority over the second principle. J. RAWLS, supra,
at 302. And even Nozick recognizes that redistributional efforts may be called for in
order to rectify injustices resulting from past violations of his libertarian principle. R.
NozicK, supra, at 230-31. Perhaps the fair-opportunity and fair-share principles could
be justified on that ground as well as those set forth herein.
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succeed in life. To put it another way, the fortuitousness of being
born into favorable environmental circumstances does not entitle a
person to greater life chances, and vice versa. In its pure form one
might call this concept equal abilities-equal chances. Implicit in the
concept of fair share is the notion that every individual, regardless
of innate ability and drive, is entitled to some fair share of society's
goods.1 27 More specifically, the fair-share concept means that the
fortuitousness of being born with superior innate abilities entitles
one to greater life chances only to the extent that less wellendowed people also benefit thereby. The fair-share principle
clearly contemplates that some people will be better' off than others, in recognition of the fact that economic incentives may be necessary to encourage individuals to use their abilities and that their
productivity may also create benefits for the rest of society. But the
fair-share principle has a limiting factor as well in that it would
prevent the better-endowed from taking advantage of that fact to
the detriment of less well-endowed people.
Either principle could probably elicit a degree of public consensus, though my sense is that fair opportunity is the more widely
held notion. Fair opportunity is meritocratic and justifies leaving
the less well-endowed behind, so long as those of comparable abilities have comparable chances. Throughout this country's history reward based on merit has been a fundamental tenet of our economic
system and its underlying utilitarian philosophy.
Fair share is more egalitarian in that it limits the advantages
the more well-endowed may obtain. Egalitarianism does have some
public support. There is probably a fairly widely shared feeling that
certain categories of people, like the retarded, for example, or the
disabled, do deserve some share of society's goods, though they are
unable to make a significant contribution. On the other hand,
egalitarianism has definite limitations to its appeal. There would
likely be a fair number of objectors, for example, should someone
suggest that a person born into the "best" of families and educated
at the "best" of schools, but who does not want to work, is nevertheless entitled to a fair share.
To a court desirous of intervening, the fair-opportunity and
fair-share principles seem sufficiently widely held to command
public acceptance in appropriate cases as being implicit in our
127. See note 126 supra. I am using the term "goods" here in its broadest
sense to refer to whatever material or nonmaterial rewards an individual might

value.
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democratic constitutional system, 128 and sufficiently specific to enable a court to identify those goods with respect to which intervention might be appropriate. Food, clothing, shelter, health care, and
education would have to be high on the list of anyone who adhered
29
to either principle.'
At this point, however, advocates of judicial intervention in
the class struggle will have to admit the task becomes somewhat
difficult. Though the fundamental goods have been identified, how
is a court to determine how much of those goods are required by
the two principles? For example, at first blush it might appear that
the fair-opportunity principle tolerates rather wide disparities in
the allocation of educational resources in favor of those who perform better in school, and thus in favor of the children of the wellto-do who tend to perform better.' 3 0 But fair opportunity derives
from the notion of equal abilities-equal chances, and unless one indulges in the assumption that the children of the poor are inherently inferior, the success of well-to-do children would seem attributable more to their advantageous environmental circumstances
than to their innate characteristics.' 3 ' Fair opportunity, then,
would arguably require a greater allocation of educational resources
to the poor than to the well-off in order to counterbalance the dis32
advantages of adverse environment.'
128. The constitutional principle might be stated as follows: The government
may not affirmatively deprive, or so structure society as to deprive, a person of access to a fair opportunity to succeed in life or to a fair share of society's goods.
129. The designation of particular goods as fundamental would thus key a
court's inquiry. The more related a good is to fair opportunity and fair share, the
more searching would be a court's inquiry into the degree of disparity in access to
the good and into the government's justifications for the disparity. The less related a
good is to those principles, the greater would be a court's deference to the government's determination. See notes 160 & 186 infra. Admittedly, identifying fundamental goods would entail the exercise of judicial discretion. But that discretion would
be constrained by the necessity of selecting goods as to which there is a high degree
of public consensus regarding their relatedness to fair opportunity and fair share.
Moreover, the alternative approach of no court intervention at all in the class struggle would be worse in light of the disadvantages already constraining poor people in
terms of the opportunity for mobility and of access to the political process.
130. See J. COLEMAN, E. CAMPBELL, C. HOBSON, J. MCPARTLAND, A. MOOD,
F. WEINFELD & R. YORK, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 298-302
(1966); note 132 infra.
131. In case of doubt, the moral approach would certainly seem to be to assume people are born with roughly comparable innate abilities unless fairly conclusively shown otherwise on an individual basis.
132. The disadvantage of being poor in terms of the opportunity for an education and of the ability to get ahead in life has been widely documented: "The family
into which a man is born exerts a profound influence on his career, because his oc-
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But how much more would be necessary, and could any
amount of education totally make up for an adverse environment?
33
We are not yet capable of answering those questions precisely.'
An interventionist court might thus be tempted to adopt equal perpupil expenditures as a rough approximation of what the fairopportunity principle requires, realizing all the while that life
chances may still not have been equalized.' 34 But that is not the
end of the matter, since educational quality is a function of many
factors in addition to the amount of money spent, in particular
the quality of instruction. The difficulty ghetto schools have in attracting competent and sensitive teachers is well known,135 yet
how is a court to deal with the problem except again by approximation?
Equal money for education is better than less money would
doubtless be the response from the poor. Yet there are studies incupational life is conditioned by his education, and his education depends to a considerable extent on his family." P. BLAU & 0. DUNCAN, supra note 114, at 330. But
see C. JENCKS, M. SMITH, H. ACLAND, M. J.BANE, D. COHEN, H. GINTIS, B. HEYNS
& S. MICHELSON, INEQUALITY (1972) who conclude that family background bears

only a moderate, though significant, relationship to an individual's educational attainment, occupational status, and income. Id. at 138-43, 176-99, 209-32. That assessment was revised in a more recent study which concluded that "[family] background
exerts a larger influence on economic outcomes than past research had suggested.
...If our aim is to reduce the impact of being born to one set of parents rather than
another, we still have a long way to go." C. JENCKS, S. BARTLETT, M. CORCORAN,
J. CROUSE, D. EAGLESFIELD, G. JACKSON, K. MCCLELLAND, P. MOESER, M. OLNECK,
J. SCHWARTZ, S. WARD & J. WILLIAMS, WHO GETS AHEAD? 229-30 (1979).
133. In C. JENCKS, M. SMITH, H. ACLAND, M. J. BANE, D. COHEN, H. GINTIS,
B. HEYNS & S. MICHELSON, supra note 132, the authors conclude that equalizing

educational opportunity, or even providing compensatory education for disadvantaged students, would have little impact on educational attainment or life chances,
based largely on the greater impact of the out-of-school environment and even of
random chance. Id. at 158-59, 191-92, 226-27, 253-55. The issue continues to be debated, however. See McDermott & Klein, The Cost-Quality Debate in School Finance Litigation: Do Dollars Make a Difference?, 38 LAW & CONTENI'. PROB. 415

(1974). As might be expected, educational attainment itself-in terms of the amount
rather than the quality of education-has been found to have a substantial impact on
life chances. C. JENCKS, S. BARTLETT, M. CORCORAN, J.CROUSE, D. EAGLESFIELD,
C. JACKSON, K. MCCLELLAND, P. MUESER, M. OLNECK, J. SCHWARTZ, S. WARD, &
J.WILLIAMS, supra note 132, at 230, 295.

134. That is why the principle is better called fair opportunity than equal opportunity. Even the one-man, one-vote rule, despite its mathematical precision, is
something of an approximation. Underlying the rule must be some policy of equal or
fair access to the political process. Yet access to the political process depends, in addition to the weight of one's vote, on other factors which afford some people far
more political influence than others: for example, money and the ability to articulate
one's position.
135.

See J.KoZOL, DEATH AT AN EARLY AGE (1967).
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dicating that in some states equal per-pupil expenditures would result in loss of revenue to central-city school districts which still
have relatively high tax bases, despite large numbers of poor people, due to their industrial and commercial taxpayers. 136 Furthermore, it may be cheaper to provide identical services in some areas
of a state than others; the cost of teachers may be less in rural
areas, for example, because of lower costs of living. Equal perpupil expenditures would not respond to these factors.
Such considerations have led commentators to suggest other
acceptable methods of equalization, notably district-power equalization and family-power equalization. 13 7 Under district-power equalization, the amount of money available to school districts would depend not on their tax bases but on their tax rates. Districts wishing
to spend more money on education could do so by imposing higher
rates, but all districts imposing the same rate would get the same
amount of money per pupil. The amounts at various tax rates
would be predetermined by the state. Districts whose tax rates
yielded more than the predetermined amount would have to turn
the excess over to the state, while districts whose tax rates yielded
less would receive money from the state to make up the difference.
Still, this would be an imperfect scheme according to the fair-opportunity principle, since districts with poor tax bases and large
numbers of poor people might well decide on low tax rates for education because of the financial hardship of high rates on poor people, as well as the demand for other governmental services as to
8
which there may be no equalization.13
Under family-power equalization, the amount of money avail136. See Berke & Callahan, Inequities in School Finance, in SENATE SELECT
COMMISSION ON EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY IN THE UNITED STATES, THE
FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 41, 65-71 (1972);

Note, A Statistical Analysis of The School Finance Decisions: On Winning Battles
and Losing Wars, 81 YALE L.J. 1303 (1972). But see Grubb & Michelson, Public
School Finance in a Post-SerranoWorld, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 550 (1973).
137. J. COONS, W. CLUNE & S. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC
EDUCATION 200-42 (1970); Coons & Sugarman, Family Choice in Education: A
Model State System for Vouchers, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 321 (1971).
138. In the Rodriguez case, though, the poor Edgewood School District did
have a higher equalized tax rate than the well-to-do Alamo Heights District and
would thus have received more funds than Alamo Heights under a district-power
equalization scheme, as contrasted with the far lower funding level it actually did
have. 411 U.S. at 12-13. Moreover, poorer districts apparently tax themselves more
heavily for education quite frequently. See J. COONS, W. CLUNE & S. SUGARMAN,

supra note 137, at 83, 94, 140-44. That fact may reflect poorer people's having to
spend relatively larger shares of their incomes on the necessities of life.
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able for education would depend on each family's willingness to tax
itself, with funds being redistributed among families in much the
same fashion as under district power-equalization. This has the advantage of divorcing the amount of education available to a child
from the collective whims of the people in the child's district.
However, it still leaves the amount of education at the discretion of
a child's parents, and it seems likely that many poor people who
may not value education as highly as richer people, or who are otherwise financially hardpressed, would decide on low tax rates for
education. Yet the basic ethical notion underlying the fairopportunity principle is that such fortuitous environmental factors
should not stand in the way of one's life chances. In addition,
family-power equalization would entail such a drastic restructuring
of the administration of education (each district would have to provide a range of schools for families choosing differing tax rates) that
even the most interventionist court would likely be unwilling to
mandate it as a solution.
Realizing all this, a court committed to the fair-opportunity
principle might be tempted to return to equal per-pupil expenditures as the best available solution. But there is yet another potential problem-that relatively well-to-do families may try to avoid
the financial impact of equal per-pupil expenditures by abandoning
public schools for private schools, as is their constitutional right.1 39
Full equalization would then be technically impossible to achieve.
In the long run the result might well be private schools for families
with above-average incomes and public schools for below-averageincome families. Equalization might exist for public schools, but
the funds available for equalization would be small if the children
of the more affluent taxpayers no longer attended. Such consequences are not farfetched. The Supreme Court's desegregation
rulings have induced many white families to move to private
schools. 1 40 While courts are obliged to resolve fairly the dispute at
hand, not to consider the spillover impacts of their decisions would
be foolhardy.
The ability of parents to defeat attempts at achieving fair opportunity in education in the family-power equalization and private
school contexts suggests a further problem in implementing the
principle-conflicts with other constitutionally significant values.
139.
140.

Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
See sources cited note 44 supra.
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Fair opportunity is an individualistic principle in that it seeks to
compensate children for the disadvantages of unfavorable family
environments. Yet our society places a high value on the family,
and sometimes views the individual rights of children as subordinate to family values and the fate of children as deservedly dependent on the fate of the family. These competing values must be
balanced, but there is no clearcut answer as to what the proper
balance is.
Similar problems arise under the fair-share principle. Once a
court has identified food, clothing, and shelter, for example, as
goods to which at least some people are entitled regardless of innate abilities, the question of minimum quantity must still be answered. The fair-share principle does tell us what the minimum is
in theory. It would have society redistribute wealth from richer to
poorer until the point is reached where poorer people would be
made worse off by further redistribution. This could occur if further redistributions so destroy the incentive of poorer people to
work that they become unproductive wards of the state, or so de14
moralize richer people that they too become unwilling to work. 1
Unfortunately, it is probably impossible to determine what that
point is.
Furthermore, as with education, family values may conflict
with the ability to ensure individuals their fair share of food, clothing, and shelter. In a society which values parental childrearing,
redistributions designed to provide children with their fair share
will have to be administered by their parents. At times society may
feel that parents are squandering the money, using it for their own
support instead of working, or are irresponsibly imposing on society the cost of providing for more and more of their children. In
that situation, steps designed to prevent parents from receiving
more than their fair share may well be inconsistent with what the
fair-share principle would require for their children.
The point of the foregoing discussion is not to present the parade of horribles which shows why court intervention in the class
struggle is unwarranted. Rather, in light of the line drawing and
value judgments which the achievement of economic justice entails, it is to gain a perspective on what can realistically be expected
of the courts.
141. Since disincentive/demoralization effects are likely to be much greater
when "able-bodied" adults are involved than "disadvantaged" people (such as children, the retarded, the disabled, and the infirm), even an activist court would likely
be more willing to intervene on fair-share grounds on behalf of the latter.
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Some commentators argue that line drawing and value judgments are functions for the legislative process, and not the
courts. 14 2 Why, they might ask, if society accepts the fair-op-

portunity principle, has it not voluntarily done what is necessary
to ensure comparable life chances for individuals of comparable
ability? Does not the welfare system's designation of eligible recipients reflect the extent to which society accepts the fair-share principle? Does not the amount of welfare provided reflect society's determination of the point at which disincentive effects outweigh the
benefits of more redistribution?
The answers lie in the divergence between moral conceptions
and self-interest on the one hand, and in the tendency to undervalue the other person on the other hand. It is easier to profess adherence in principle to fair opportunity or fair share than to acknowledge the injustice of the existing distribution, or to
voluntarily give up some of what one has in the name of the principle.1 43 Furthermore, if the disadvantaged lack fair access to the political process, their interests are not likely to receive fair weight
when the decisions are made. There is thus a need for some independent, disinterested body, such as the Supreme Court, to point
out those situations when self-interest is obviously running counter
to the moral underpinnings of the society, and to ensure that the
interests of the disadvantaged are not discounted by the political
process. The latter would seem to be the rationale for Harper v.
Virginia Board of Elections,i 4 the poll-tax case, and both underly
Brown.1 45 If, then, the contention that poor people cannot opt out

142. See, e.g., Ely, Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV.
L. REV. 5, 33-39, 49-52 (1978); Sandalow, supra note 61; Winter, supra note 9, at
89-97, 99-102.
143. Most people today, for instance, would probably find enforced segregation

morally offensive, though self-interest may still lead many whites to try to avoid integration. Adherence to the underlying principle, however, might well make one more
willing to accept an adverse political or judicial decision. This lends support to the
notion that Supreme Court decisions, if they are to be effective, must be based on
principles which are rather widely shared by, or at least acceptable to, the public.
144. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
145. Many cases, in addition to Harperand Brown, are reflective of what might
be called a principle of fair access to the political process. See L. TRIBE, supra note
12, §§ 13-1 to -12, 16-44 to -47 and cases cited therein. If the Court is to give deference to legislative decisions, assuring that the political process is open and operates
fairly would certainly seem to be an appropriate role for the Court. In fact, in light of
the value judgments entailed in articulating substantive legal rights, several commentators have suggested that the Court focus primarily on issues of the malfunctioning of the political process where the Constitution does not explicitly set
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and do not have fair access to the political process is correct, the
argument for Supreme Court intervention is still strong despite the
value-judgment and line-drawing problems.
Where proponents of judicial restraint in class-struggle cases
go wrong is in tying their assessment of the validity of court intervention to the need to draw exact lines as to how much redistribution is appropriate in particular cases. Due to the difficulty of
showing that a specific outcome is compelled by underlying principles, courts sometimes appear arbitrary when making particularized judgments.146 Thus, since any principle sufficiently abstract to
be worthy of constitutional stature must be able to tolerate a range
of particular outcomes, there is reason for court deference to legislative responsiveness and expertise so long as a decision is within
the tolerable range.
Deference to legislative judgments, however, is not inconsisforth substantive rights. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 142; Sandalow, supra note 61.
However, Professor Baker has effectively demonstrated the inadequacy of a theory of
judicial review which focuses entirely on process issues (what he calls the "neutrality" model): the principal ones being that it favors the rich and powerful who have
more political influence; that assuring everyone an effective voice in the process demands dealing with the very substantive issues which the process approach seeks to
avoid, i.e., the inequalities which inhibit effective political participation of the disadvantaged in the first place; and that it would permit the continual subordination of
particular groups in society so long as they have an effective voice in the process.
Baker, supra note 110, at 1055-61. Professor Baker suggests two alternative models of
equal protection analysis: an "outcome equality" model which in its pure form
would require equal treatment of everybody; and an "equality of respect" model
which would mandate the political order to respect "the equality of worth of all citizens." Id. at 1030-31. The dichotomy herein between equal rights/equal wealth and
fair opportunity/fair share roughly parallels the outcome-equality and equality-ofrespect models. Being concerned primarily to criticize the neutrality model, Professor Baker tentatively concludes that the equality-of-respect model is the most ethically satisfying approach, id. at 1096, a conclusion which my argument for fair
opportunity/fair share supports. That approach, which would find certain substantive
outcomes constitutionally compelled even though a political process guaranteeing
everyone an equally effective voice would decide otherwise, has its own difficulties;
notably, the problem of determining what outcomes are compelled by abstract
standards like equal protection. This Article is an attempt to tackle that problem.
146. An example may be the Supreme Court's attempt in the abortion context
to accommodate two strongly held values-a woman's privacy interest and society's
interest in protecting fetal life-by drawing the line beyond which the society's interest predominates at viability. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973). Since the
line might just as well have been drawn at conception or at birth, some commentators have criticized the Court's decision as overly legislative. See, e.g., Ely, The
Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 923-37 (1973).
But if a woman's privacy interest is a principle worthy of protection, a line had to be
drawn somewhere.
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tent with judicial intervention in those instances where the treatment of the poor is obviously beyond the range of permissible
outcomes. Of course, that determination is itself a line-drawing
process, and I can offer no precise formula for setting outer boundaries. Depending on the case, there are factors to which a court
can look for aid. In exclusionary-zoning cases a demographic study
comparing building costs and the numbers of lower-income people
in communities within the region may be helpful, though some
suburbs may be less desirable than others for lower-priced housing
in terms of the availability of transportation and other services. In
school-finance cases studies comparing the educational attainment
of children in poorer and richer districts may be relevant, though it
may be difficult to make causal connections between money spent
and quality of education. 147 In welfare cases government studies of
the cost of a minimum standard of living may be useful, though
they are subjective judgments and there may be valid freeloader
and incentive arguments for providing less than the minimum.148
Ultimately factual determinations of this type often come down
to Justice Stewart's "I know it when I see it" approach.149 Perhaps
this is the most one can expect from the courts in class-struggle
cases. Yet, while it does lead to unpredictable results, it is not unprincipled, being tied to fair opportunity and fair share. Nor is it
mere judicial hunching, so long as relevant social factors are taken
into account. 150 Finally, this approach seems no more discretionary
than the factual determinations being made in virtually every area
of constitutional law. How does one really know when there is a
"clear and present danger" justifying infringement of free speech,
or when a search is "unreasonable," or whether punishment is
15 1
"cruel and unusual," except "I know when I see it?"'

147.

See note 133 supra. At some point money must make a difference-the ex-

treme case being none at all.
148. See text accompanying notes 165-167 infra.
149. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). In
concurring in the Court's judgment that a French film entitled "Les Amants" was not

obscene, Justice Stewart wrote:
I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand
to be embraced within that shorthand description [i.e., hard-core pornography]; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I
know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not
that.
Id. (Stewart, J., concurring).
150. See note 108 supra.
151. 378 U.S. at 197 (Stewart, J., concurring). Such decisions ultimately depend
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THE PRINCIPLES APPLIED
My greatest criticism of the way in which the Burger Court
has handled the class-struggle question has more to do with its approach than the results of cases. School finance, welfare rights, and
exclusionary zoning all raise issues which implicate the fair-

opportunity and fair-share principles. Yet in none of the cases has
the Court adequately indicated that there are limits, and constitutional principles underlying those limits, beyond which government may not go.
Justice Powell, who wrote the majority opinion upholding
Texas' school-financing system in Rodriguez, gave us a hint of his
limit almost in passing when he suggested the result might be otherwise had poor children been totally denied the opportunity for
an education. 15 2 Total deprivation could easily happen if the government were to shift to a tuition-fee method of financing public
education. 15 3 But why would that offend Justice Powell to the
point of causing him to bring the power of the Court to bear?
Would he be similarly offended if a poor person could not afford
other items for which user fees are charged-a telephone, for example? If not, there must be something special to him about education. In short, there must be some constitutional principle he
feels would be violated if poor children were completely deprived
of the opportunity for an education.
One might suspect that at some level Justice Powell adheres
to the fair-opportunity and fair-share principles. If he does, he
should have said so. As it is, his reticence has left us with no principled basis for distinguishing between the relative deprivation in
Rodriguez and his hypothetical total deprivation. In addition, dictum plays an important role in this area of the law in informing
government that there are limits. Even a case adjudged by the
on determinations of which side of the lines the facts fall. See, e.g., Rummel v.
Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (5-4 decision in cruel-and-unusual-punishment case);
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972) (6-3 decision in unreasonable-search-andseizure case); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941) (5-4 decision in clear-andpresent-danger case).
152. "Whatever merit appellees' argument might have if a State's financing system occasioned an absolute denial of educational opportunities to any of its children,
that argument provides no basis for finding an interference with fundamental rights
where only relative differences in spending levels are involved .. " 411 U.S. at 37.
153. The tuition-fee approach is, of course, often used for higher public education which might be distinguished from elementary and secondary education on the
grounds that college-age students are capable of working their way through school or
borrowing money based on future earning potential.
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Court to fall within the broad range of constitutionally permissible

outcomes could aid the poor in overcoming their relative lack of
political power, if couched in terms which encourage the government to deal with the problem of school finance.
At this juncture one might ask Justice Powell whether there
are not points short of total deprivation, but still so disparate as to

cause serious educational disadvantage, that would trigger his sense
of injustice. Powell went out of his way to praise Texas' Minimum

Foundation Program 154 under which the state provided money to
local school districts and which could be viewed as an equalizing

factor. 155 But suppose Texas had no state equalization of any kind,
and made local school districts rely entirely on their own fiscal resources. On the Rodriguez facts that would have resulted in
1967-1968 in a $26 per-pupil expenditure in the largely Chicano
Edgewood District, as compared with $333 per pupil in the well-

to-do Alamo Heights District.' 56 Would that be sufficient deprivation to move Justice Powell to intervene? One cannot know, of

course, and one certainly would not expect or want a judge to decide in dictum all possible future cases. But if it would be enough,
then Justice Powell has been overly generous to the government

with his total-deprivation dictum.157
Something considerably short of total deprivation ought to
154. TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 16.01 (Vernon 1972) (current version at
TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 16.001 (Vernon Supp. 1980)).
155. Justice Powell's discussion of the Minimum Foundation Program appears

at 411 U.S. at 6-13. As between the two districts used for purposes of comparison in
the case, the state actually provided more money per pupil over and above local revenues to the richer Alamo Heights District than to the poorer Edgewood District.
For example, in the 1967-68 school year Alamo Heights raised $333 per pupil
through local taxes and received $225 from the state for a total of $558, while
Edgewood raised only $26 locally and received $222 from the state for a total of
$248. In 1970-71 the state furnished $491 to Alamo Heights as compared with only
$356 to Edgewood. Id. at 12-13. The Minimum Foundation Program could thus be
said to have increased the disparity between the districts in an absolute sense. On a
percentage basis, however, the Foundation Program brought the districts closer together.
156. And with a higher tax rate in the Edgewood District at that. Id. at 12-13.
157. Perhaps Justice Powell would not quite require total deprivation before
intervening, as indicated by the following statement which concludes the quote, see
note 152 supra: "[N]o charge fairly could be made that the [state's financing] system
fails to provide each child with an opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills
necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full participation in the
political process." 411 U.S. at 37. One gets the impression, though, that the minimal
skill level to which Powell refers is not far removed from complete illiteracy, even
though students at the minimal level might have nowhere near the chance to succeed in life as those receiving more education.
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trigger the Court's sense of injustice. The survey submitted in
Rodriguez of roughly 10% of the school districts in Texas showed
that the very poorest districts, both in terms of property value and
family income, were heavily populated by minorities and had average combined state and local revenues of only $305 per pupil. That
compared with $815 per pupil in the very richest districts and $483
per pupil in the median district. 158
Perhaps the variations in per-pupil expenditures as compared
with district and family wealth in the great majority of Texas'
school districts is constitutionally permissible. 159 Perhaps even the
far greater than average expenditures in the very richest districts
should be allowed. But when the very poorest districts are as far
below average as was the case in Rodriguez, it is doubtful that the
education received by children in those districts will provide them
with anywhere near the opportunity to succeed in and enjoy life as
will the education furnished the vast majority of students. 160 To
that extent the school-financing system in Texas should have been
invalidated and the legislature required to devise some means of
rectifying the situation. While still giving deference if it chose to
do so to the legislative solution, the Court would have forced the
issue to be dealt with by a level of government having the capacity
158. 411 U.S. at 15 n.38. Moreover, the very richest districts had average tax
rates less than half that of the very poorest districts. See Rodriguez v. San Antonio
Indep. School Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280, 282 (W.D. Tex. 1971).
159. Excluding the ten richest and four poorest districts in the survey, average
state and local per-pupil expenditures in the remaining 96 districts ranged from $462
in districts with taxable property per pupil of $10,000-$30,000 to $544 in districts

with taxable property of $50,000-$100,000. See note 158 supra.
160.

The relatedness of education to success in and enjoyment of life is what

distinguishes it from cases involving other public services. See note 129 supra. Consider, for example, municipal services other than education. In all respects except
the nature of the service the case may be on all fours with Rodriguez. Thus poor residents of a poor community might claim that reliance on local property taxes prevents their affording services (such as streets, sewers, and police) comparable to
richer communities. They might argue that these services are as related to mobility
as education in that inferior municipal services contribute to neighborhood decline,
which in turn engenders feelings of inferiority and apathy, which in turn inhibit the
desire to learn, work hard, participate in the political process, and so on. It would
probably not be too hard to find professional support for these contentions. Yet the
connection between other municipal services and mobility/access to the political
process does seem more attenuated than with respect to education, and that difference may justify saying that no fundamental good is involved and that reliance on local taxes is justifiable in order to foster local control. Still, cases are conceivable in
which a community might be so poor that the level of municipal services it can afford is so inferior to other communities that a court should intervene.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol9/iss3/3

46

Kleven: The Supreme Court, Race, and the Class Struggle
SUPREME COURT AND CLASS STRUGGLE

to redistribute wealth, and perhaps thereby would have strengthened the hand of the poor in the political process.
Turning to Dandridge, in which the Court upheld 61 the maximum grant provision under Aid to Families with Dependent Children 62 (AFDC), my quarrel here is mainly with approach since I
am reluctantly prepared to go along with the result. As noted
earlier,' 6 3 by analogizing welfare rights to business-regulation
cases, the Court implied it would give total deference to governmental welfare determinations. Business regulations, however,
tend to affect people with a weaker claim for court protection than
the poor in terms of access to the political process, the ability to
opt out, and the harshness of the regulatory impact.' 64 The effect
of Maryland's maximum grant provision in Dandridge was to cut off
most families from additional aid at about six children.' 65 Suppose,
instead, the government cut off welfare benefits entirely for families with more than six children. Would not one want the Court to
consider the impact such action would have on the welfare of affected children in regard to their ability to obtain food, clothing,
and shelter? One could, of course, go on to ask how close to total
deprivation the government could go before the Court's sense of
injustice would (or should) be moved. As with Rodriguez, my basic
criticism of the Court's approach in Dandridge is that it was overly
generous to the government with its economic-regulation dictum.
The Court should have said in Dandridge that AFDC provides
poor children with the basic necessities of life, without some minimum quantity of which the fair-opportunity and fair-share principles are violated. The Court could then have indicated that it
would give great deference to governmental welfare determinations
as long as such determinations are within the permissible range.
Not to indicate, though, that at some point the Court would intervene is probably not accurate-and if it is, the Court misperceives
its function-and weights the political process even more heavily
against the poor.
161. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,478-80 (1970).
162. 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1976).
163. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
164. The Court evidently perceived these distinctions but was unwilling to let
the case turn on them for reasons it did not make clear: "We recognize the dramatically real factual difference between the [state regulation of business or industry]
cases and this one, but we can find no basis for applying a different constitutional
standard." 397 U.S. at 485 (footnote omitted).
165. See Williams v. Dandridge, 297 F. Supp. 450, 453-55 (D. Md. 1968).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1981

47

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 3 [1981], Art. 3
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9: 795

So approached, Dandridge is a reasonably close case on the
merits. Cutting against the government were the facts that the
maximum grant provision left larger families with less money than
was necessary for a minimum standard of living, that by the government's admission most AFDC parents were unemployable so
that encouraging recipients to work could not stand as a justification for the provision, and that the fiscal impact of requiring more
aid to large families would probably be relatively minor. 1 6 On the
other side, however, since AFDC, though technically aid to children, is widely regarded as money provided to parents to enable
them to support themselves and their families, the government
might argue that a cut-off is needed to deter parents from having
large families in order to increase their own lifestyles, or to prevent irresponsible parents from imposing their obligations on the
rest of society. The government might also argue that the cut-off is
needed to keep the incomes of welfare families below those of
wage-earning families so as not to discourage the latter from working. Such arguments could be used to justify not just cut-off points
for larger families, but also provision for less than minimum needs
across the board. Nor are they totally devoid of merit in a society
which relies heavily on the family to raise children, and on economic incentives as a means of encouraging productivity.
The result in Dandridgewould thus seem to be within acceptable bounds, even though the financial impact of the maximum
grant provision on the complainants was substantial. 167 Similarly,
166. As of March 1977, only 3.6% of all AFDC families nationwide had more
than five children. In fact, 83.7% had three children or less. H. OBE.HEU, supra
note 33, at 4-5.
167. The complainants in the case consisted of two families: one a mother and
eight children; the other a disabled man, his wife, and eight children. The standard
of need for the families was $296.15 and $331.50 per month, respectively. The maximum grant provision limited both families to $250.00 per month. Williams v.
Dandridge, 297 F. Supp. 450, 453 (D. Md. 1968).
Likewise, the decision in Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1971), in which
the Court upheld Texas' practice of paying AFDC recipients only 75% of their
standard of need, seems acceptable, assuming Texas' standard-of-need determination
was not so unreasonable as to negate deferential treatment. See note 36 supra. It
should be noted, however, that 87% of the AFDC recipients in Texas were black and
Mexican-American; whereas only 39.8% were minorities in the old-age assistance
program under which Texas-provided 100% of standard of need, and only 46.9% and
55.7% were minorities in the two programs providing aid to the disabled under
which Texas provided 95% of standard of need. 406 U.S. at 548 n.17. That fact raises
an inference of possible racial discrimination which merits closer scrutiny than Justice Rehnquist's statement that "[s]ince budgetary constraints do not allow the pay-
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court deference to the overall level of benefits under AFDC (and
other welfare programs) seems justifiable though they fall below
governmentally determined minimum needs. Perhaps somewhat
greater deference to governmental welfare determinations than to
school-finance schemes is called for in light of the more controversial nature of welfare, the fact that welfare determinations are already made at levels of government which have the capacity for redistribution, and the greater potential interference with the
functioning of the economic system. At some point, however, aid
to poor families could be so low that poor children would have no
reasonable opportunity to develop their innate abilities, or that
one's sensibilities would (or should) be offended when individuals with
no control over their destinies are allowed to live in degradation
regardless of innate ability. 168 It may not be possible to identify
that point on any basis other than "I know it when I see it," but
when it becomes patently obvious the Court should intervene.
It is harder to criticize the results of exclusionary-zoning cases
since a full-blown exclusionary suit has not yet been heard by the
Court on the merits. Valtierra, for instance, entailed a general attack on California's public-housing-referendum provision, and in
that context there may be reason to defer to California's devotion
to democracy. 16 9 But suppose public-housing referenda, or zoning
referenda as in Eastlake,170 were used as part of an exclusionary
pattern. Consider, for example, the facts in Hills v. Gautreaux,""1
the cross-district public-housing case. The Chicago Housing Aument of the full standard of need for all welfare recipients, the state may have concluded that the aged and infirm are the least able of the categorial grant recipients to
bear the hardships of an inadequate standard of living." Id. at 549 (emphasis added).
168. That point may well have been reached in Texas. Since 1969, Texas has
not increased at all its level of benefits under AFDC. Today a typical family of four
(a mother and three minor children) with no other income is entitled to $140 a
month under AFDC and to food stamps worth about $200 per month, for total benefits of roughly $340. Telephone conversation with Charles Ternes, Public Information Officer, Region 11, Texas Department of Human Resources (May 5, 1981). It is
hard to imagine how such a family could maintain anything approaching a decent
standard of living.
169. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
There is a legitimate debate (which is beyond the purview of this Article) as to
whether referring particularized issues to the electorate really is consistent with
democratic principles. See Sager, Insular Majorities Unabated: Warth v. Seldin and

City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 91 HARV. L. REv. 1373, 1402-23
(1978).
170. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976); see
note 56 supra.

171. 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
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thority's practice (condoned by HUD) of allowing city aldermen to
informally veto public-housing projects in their districts led to the
controversy. As a result of this practice, virtually all family publichousing projects were located in black neighborhoods, and the district court had little difficulty finding the practice racially discriminatory. 172 But what if the same result had been achieved through a
referendum process? Can the electorate itself do what its representatives cannot? There are precedents to the contrary, 1 73 but before one is too quick to answer no, recall Arlington Heights,1 74 the
racial exclusionary-zoning case, which stands for the principle
that racially disparate effect is not enough to make a case under
equal protection and that a racially discriminatory purpose must be
shown. 17 5 How is that to be done in the context of voters casting
secret ballots? Again in Valtierra the Court was overly generous to
the government in not indicating that there may be limits to the
ways in which even racially colorblind referenda may be used.
Nor did Arlington Heights mount much of a challenge to that
community's overall land-use practices. The complainants rested
their case on the racially disparate impact of the refusal to rezone a
particular parcel in a single-family area for multifamily subsidized
housing. 176 Since zoning is on its face racially neutral, they might
have attacked the entire scheme on economic grounds. However,
the complainants obviously felt an economic argument offered little
chance of success in light of Valtierra's other prong (that is, lowincome housing is not a suspect class), the Court's refusal to find
housing a fundamental right in Lindsey v. Normet,17 7 and
Warth's1 78 requirement of a particular project to obtain standing.
Warth, in fact, presented the best facts of any of the land-use
cases-a claim of overall economic exclusion by a wealthy suburb

172.

Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969).

173. See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 392 (1969) (striking down as violative of equal protection voter-enacted city-charter provision which required voter approval of any local fair-housing ordinance).
174. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252 (1977).
175. Id. at 265. For a discussion of the purpose-versus-effect issue, which is beyond the scope of this Article, see Clark, Legislative Motivation and Fundamental
Rights in ConstitutionalLaw, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 853 (1978); Simon, Racially
Prejudiced Governmental Actions: A Motivation Theory of the Constitutional Ban
Against Racial Discrimination,15 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 1041 (1978).
176. 429 U.S. at 268.
177. 405 U.S. 56, 73-74 (1972).
178. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
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of Rochester, New York, in which 98% of the community was
zoned for detached single-family homes.' 7 9 But the merits were
never reached due to the Court's imposition of the unduly restrictive standing requirements. 1 80 One gets the distinct impression the

Court does not want to decide a full-blown economic-exclusion
case. But why?

Perhaps, as some commentators have suggested, the Court
wants exclusionary zoning handled by state courts. 18 1 If so, it

should say so, and say why. There may be some merit in deferring
to state courts. Not only would it spread out the work load, but
state courts are also more likely to be in tune with state and local
politics, and therefore arguably in a better position to handle the
complexities of the remedial process. However, the notion that ex-

clusionary zoning should be left exclusively to the states because it
is a local problem does not seem valid.' 82 If I am a poor person
contemplating a move to another state in order to better my lot,
my decision to make the move will be affected if I can find housing
only in a low-income or minority central-city ghetto with few job

opportunities, underfunded schools, and a high crime rate.
Deferral to state courts thus seems justifiable only when state
courts are willing to intervene. In such instances, the Supreme
Court could easily develop a deferral doctrine, even after federal

courts have entered the field. If state courts are unwilling to intervene, however, federal courts still have the obligation to correct
83
constitutional violations. 1
179. Id. at 495.
180. For a discussion of the particular project issue, see Sager, supra note 169,
at 1382-88.
181. See Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls:An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385, 472 (1977); Sager, supra note 169, at 1389-92.
182. The local-problem argument could also be made regarding school finance,
as evidenced by Justice Powell's concern in Rodriguez for maintaining federalism.
411 U.S. at 44. The argument is not dissimilar to the states' rights argument advanced by southern states to try to combat federal interference with segregation. But
where constitutionally protected federal rights are involved, the issue is no longer
local.
183. In other contexts, the Supreme Court has recognized its obligation to intervene when exclusionary practices impact federal rights. See Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (overthrowing ordinance which effectively
barred minor child from residing with his grandparent). But see Village of Belle
Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (upholding similar ordinance as applied to
unrelated persons). Even commentators who want the issue left to the state courts
believe some kind of sanction should be brought to bear against overly parochial
suburbs who are able to enjoy the advantages of proximity to a major city while
avoiding sharing in its costs. See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 181.
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Perhaps, then, the Court is not prepared to find a classic case
of exclusionary zoning a constitutional violation. If so, it should say
so, and say why. Is it because the fair-opportunity and fair-share
principles are not implicated, as they would seem to be in a case of
total deprivation of the opportunity for education? Many would
contend that the opportunity to live in suburbia is the reward for
working one's way out, and that for courts to force open the doors
to lower-income people would remove that incentive to productivity. Against that claim must be weighed the effect of being locked
inside central cities on the ability of poor people to find jobs, finance the education of their children, and enjoy a decent living environment. Moreover, those excluded have no direct access to the
local political processes where the exclusionary decisions are made,
so that as with education court intervention can be seen as a
means of forcing the issue to a higher level of government where
the spillover impacts of exclusionary zoning are more likely to be
taken into account.184

In some respects the case for Supreme Court intervention in
exclusionary zoning may be even stronger than for school finance
and welfare rights. Racially segregated housing patterns are what
stand in the way of efforts to integrate schools. Economically segregated housing patterns are the root cause of the fiscal imbalance
underlying the school-finance issue and contribute to poverty problems generally. So eliminating exclusionary-zoning practices may
do more in the long run to alleviate those problems than attacking
them directly. In addition, the line-drawing problem in determining when a community has gone too far is somewhat easier than in
the school-finance and welfare contexts. Some interventionist state
courts have developed the "fair share" approach, under which a
community is obligated to make it possible for lower-income hous184. 'Professor Tribe has suggested that in areas of moral flux (i.e., when issues
are being widely debated in society, and there does not yet seem to be any widespread consensus) an appropriate role for the courts would be to rule in ways which
keep the debate going rather than in ways which tend to foreclose debate. See Tribe,
supra note 61, at 298-303. There is much, I think, to be said for that suggestion, and
the approach I am recommending here is quite consistent with it. It seems fair to say

that class-struggle issues are in a state of flux in our society and perhaps always will
be. And the fact that major decisionmaking responsibility with respect to several

class-struggle issues (notably school financing and zoning) has been put in the hands
of local government, coupled with economic segregation on the local level, tends to
exclude the poor from participating in the debate regarding those issues. By deciding
cases so as to force higher levels of government, which have the capacity to redistribute wealth and to which the poor have greater access, to deal with these issues,

the Supreme Court would thus contribute to keeping the debate open.
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ing to be built there in numbers equivalent to its fair share of the
regional need for such housing.'

85

Regional need can be deter-

mined by planning studies. A community's fair share of that need
could be based on such factors as population, tax base, land availability, access to transportation and jobs relative to other communities in the region; and the impact of a community's land-use practices on the availability of lower-income housing could be judged
by comparing its practices with those of other nonexclusionary communities. The Court might want to defer to the political branches
for a precise determination of a community's fair share, but if it is
at least willing to step in when communities have been overly exclusionary, fair share would seem to be a manageable standard for
identifying the "I know it when I see it" case. i 86 Finally, the remedial constraints may be somewhat less serious for exclusionary
zoning than for other class-struggle issues.
REMEDIAL CONSTRAINTS

As with school desegregation, class-struggle cases would present the Court with substantial remedial problems should it decide
to intervene. The simplest judicial remedy, that which entails the
least intrusion into the political process, is to strike down the offending governmental action. Just as the Court could have outlawed mandatory segregation without doing more, so in classstruggle cases it could strike down practices which violate the
fair-opportunity and fair-share principles, leaving remedial action to
the political process. For several reasons, however, merely striking
down the offending practices is unlikely to cure the problem; so
the issue of court involvement in the political process must be addressed.
First, since the political factors which led to the practice are
likely still to be at play, there may well be recalcitrance on the
part of the political process to effect a cure. After Brown v. Board
of Education,'87 for example, the southern states tried to devise
185. See text accompanying note 204 infra.
186. The line drawing and balancing of interests in which a court willing to intervene must engage in exclusionary-zoning cases, and in other class-struggle cases
as well, would seem to point toward middle scrutiny as the appropriate standard of
review. See Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 989-98; San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 97-110 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519-30 (1969) (Marshall, J., dissenting); notes 86-91 supra
and accompanying text.
187. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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schemes designed to achieve the same result as mandatory segregation. Similarly, in the class-struggle context an unconstitutional
school-finance scheme, welfare regulation, or zoning ordinance
might well be replaced with a different though equally offensive
approach. Conceivably the Court could order a specific approach,
but because of its fear of intruding too deeply into the political
process we should expect it to be reluctant to do so except as a
last resort. 188
The history of the school-finance issue before the New Jersey
Supreme Court is enlightening in this regard. In Robinson v.
Cahill,189 the New Jersey court struck down New Jersey's method
of financing public schools (which relied heavily on local property
taxes and thus produced great inequalities in financing capacity and
educational expenditures) as violative of the state constitution's requirement that the state provide a "thorough and efficient" system
of free public education.' 90 The court did not, however, specify a
remedy, and it permitted the existing scheme to be continued in
order to give the legislative process time to develop an alternative
approach.
Almost three years later, after a series of interim rulings, the
legislature finally enacted a new financing scheme which the New
Jersey Supreme Court upheld in Robinson v. Cahill.191 Although
the bill called for substantially increased state funding and substantially reduced the fiscal disparities among school districts, it did not
totally equalize school-district fiscal capacity or per-pupil expenditures. 192 In none of its Robinson opinions did the court ever articu188. By way of comparison, in the reapportionment and school-desegregation
cases the standard approach of the courts has been to allow the government an opportunity to come up with a valid apportionment scheme or an acceptable desegregation plan, and to specify a particular approach only upon the failure of the
government to do so. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1,
6-16 (1971); Brown II, 349 U.S. 294, 299-300 (1955); cf. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 586 (1964) (reapportionment).
189. 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973), cert. denied sub nom. Dickey v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 976 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Robinson I].
190. Id. at 516, 303 A.2d at 295-96.
191. Robinson v. Cahill, 69 N.J. 449, 355 A.2d 129 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Robinson V1.
192. Public School Education Act of 1975, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:7A-1 (West
Supp. 1980). The financing scheme is a modified district-power equalization approach, see text accompanying note 137 supra, whose full impact cannot be judged
until put into operation. Nor is there adequate data to make a thorough comparison
of the New Jersey approach to that of other states; for example, to the Texas' plan
upheld in Rodriguez. Suffice it to say that under the New Jersey scheme the poorer
a district the more state aid it gets, thus closing the gap between poorer and richer
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late precise standards for determining when the disparities would

be so great as to render a school-financing scheme unconstitutional.
Evidently the court was content with the "I know it when I see it"
approach and with impelling the legislature to take significant steps
to rectify the drastic disparities which existed under the prior
scheme. 193

Robinson V was not the end of the matter, however, since
financing for the new scheme depended on the enactment, for the

first time in New Jersey history, of a state income tax. When the
legislature was unable to agree on a bill, the court1 9 4 ordered the

public schools in New Jersey closed. The decision was timed to
take effect during the summer session and thus to minimize the

political reverberations which could be expected to, and did, follow. The potential confrontation was mooted when the legislature
finally enacted a state income tax. 195

The New Jersey Supreme Court was able to go to the brink
and cause the creation of a new school-financing system.1 96 But
districts in absolute terms, 69 N.J. at 482-84, 539-42, 355 A.2d at 14647, 177-78;
whereas in Rodriguez state aid actually made the gap larger. See note 155 supra.
193. Even though the legislature's new financing scheme was upheld, the possibility of future court intervention remains after Robinson V, thus continuing the judicial pressure for reform. Two of the seven justices (Pashman and Conford) clearly
felt the legislature had not moved far enough toward equalization and were prepared
to reject the new scheme. 69 N.J. at 476-512, 355 A.2d at 143-55 (Conford, J., concurring and dissenting); id. at 527-57, 355 A.2d at 171-86 (Pashman, J., dissenting).
Chief Justice Hughes concurred in the result, though he had reservations as to
whether the new scheme complied fully with the state constitution, on the ground
that the legislature, having made strides toward equalization, should be given additional time. Id. at 468-75, 355 A.2d at 139-43 (Hughes, C.J., concurring). And the
majority opinion itself emphasized that it was upholding the new scheme only on its
face, id. at 454-57, 355 A.2d at 131-32, thus implicitly holding open the possibility of
judicial intervention should the scheme, once operational, prove less equalizing than
it might appear on paper. That could happen if, for example, richer districts use their
greater revenue-raising capacity to counterbalance the equalizing tendency of the
state aid.
194. Robinson v. Cahill, 70 N.J. 155, 358 A.2d 457 (1976) (Robinson VI).
195. New Jersey Gross Income Tax Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54A:1-1 (West Supp.
1980); see D.

MANDELKER & D.

NETSCH, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A

FEDERAL SYSTEM 821 (1977).

196. The California Supreme Court, which has also been interventionist in the
school-finance area, has gone somewhat further than the New Jersey Supreme Court.
In Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Serrano I], it upheld the sufficiency of a complaint alleging that the
state's substantial reliance on local taxes to finance education, and consequent disparity in school-district fiscal capacity, was a violation of the federal and state equal
protection clauses. In response, the legislature enacted new financing legislation
which like the New Jersey plan in Robinson V provided for increased state funding
and fewer disparities than before, though not full equality in fiscal capacity. See Sen-
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what if no income tax bill had been forthcoming or no new
financing scheme? To have left the schools closed indefinitely
would have hurt the very people the court was trying to help.
Should the court then order a particular financing scheme and the
197
imposition, collection, and distribution of a state income tax?
Quite obviously we are talking about functions which have
traditionally been regarded as legislative and executive, and about
the potential for a constitutional crisis similar to that which led to
the court-packing fight during the New Deal Era. 198
The lesson of this exercise is that at some point the courts will
ultimately have to back down in the face of an overly recalcitrant
political process. The New Jersey Supreme Court's willingness to
push the legislature was undoubtedly affected by the fact that the
state's governor supported state equalization. 199 Without that political support, it is questionable whether the court would have been
willing to go as far as it did. But even if it had done nothing more
than invalidate the prior financing scheme, at least the court would
have taken a moral stand against inequitable school financing, forate Bill 90, Calif. Stats. 1972, ch. 1406, Assembly Bill i267, Calif. Stats. 1973, ch.
208; note 192 supra.
Nevertheless in Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr.

345 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Serrano II], the court held the new financing system
still to violate the state constitution's equal protection clause (Rodriguez having resolved the federal issue to the contrary subsequent to Serrano I). The court's position seems to be that only total elimination of disparities in fiscal capacity, though
not necessarily in per-pupil expenditures, will suffice. 18 Cal. 3d at 746-48, 557 P.2d
at 938-39, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 354-55. That would essentially leave the state with three
alternatives-full state funding, district-power equalization, and family-power equalization. See text accompanying notes 133-139 supra. The decision in Serrano II was,
however, a close one (4-3 with two of the dissenting justices arguing that the legislature had done enough); and now that the six-year period the trial court gave the
government to comply has run, it will be interesting to see what the court's next
move will be.
197. In Robinson v. Cahill, 69 N.J. 133, 351 A.2d 713 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as Robinson IV], the New Jersey Supreme Court did take a guarded step in this direction. Since the legislature had not been able to agree on a bill responding to the
court's objections in Robinson I, the court in Robinson IV ordered state funds appropriated for the 1976-1977 school year under certain sections of the existing state law
to be disbursed not under those sections, but in accordance with another section of
the law which provided for a greater degree of equalization. It is quite clear from the
opinion, however, that the court was uncomfortable in so doing; and that the next
step if the legislature still did not act would be to enjoin the expenditure of state
funds or to close the schools altogether, rather than continue to perform what the
court regarded as a legislative function.
198. See G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
150-52 (10th ed. 1980); Leuchtenburg, The Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt's
"Court-Packing" Plan, 1966 Sup. CT. REV. 347.
199. D. MANDELKER & D. NETSCH, supra note 195.
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cing the issue to be dealt with on the state level where the capacstrengthening
ity to redistribute wealth exists, and perhaps20thereby
0
the hand of the poor in the political process.
A second remedial constraint is that remedying class-struggle
violations almost always requires some affirmative governmental action. In the case of school finance in New Jersey, it was a new
financing system supported by a state income tax. Exclusionary
zoning also presents a good example, since even without zoning
high land and construction costs stand in the way of building housing for lower-income people in most developing suburbs. Subsidies
are needed to put such housing on the ground. However, courts
are likely to be wary of ordering that kind of affirmative governmental action for fear of intruding on traditional legislative policymaking prerogatives.
An argument against requiring affirmative action in the
exclusionary-zoning context is that government will have satisfied
constitutional mandates by removing the offending practice. What
this argument overlooks, however, is the contribution past exclusionary practices may have made to the current state of affairs. Just
as a history of mandated segregation helps create the prejudicial attitude which makes whites unwilling to accept integration, so a history of exclusionary zoning sets the tone of an elite community,
thereby driving up land prices and deterring developers from attempting low-cost housing projects.
The lingering impact of mandated segregation was undoubt200. The ongoing interaction between the legislature and court in cases like
Robinson and Serrano may well give the political process time to have an impact on
a court's posture in much the same way as the Supreme Court has been affected by
the political process in its handling of the desegregation and class-struggle issues.
See text accompanying notes 61-85 supra. For example, in Serrano I, 5 Cal. 3d 584,487
P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971), the initial ruling was a 6-1 decision, whereas
Serrano II, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1977), was decided by a
much more tenuous 4-3 decision. In the interim between the two cases the Rodriguez case was decided, thereby positioning the United States Supreme Court against
the California court which had relied largely on the federal equal protection clause
in Serrano 1. That forced the majority in Serrano II to base its decision on the state
constitution's equal protection clause, and may well have been a factor influencing
the dissenters' reluctance to intervene. Also in the interim two new justices were selected for the California Supreme Court (Justices Richardson and Clark), and both dissented in Serrano II. The selection process may well have been affected by Serrano
I. In light of the intrusiveness of such decisions into the state legislative process
there may be something to be said for that, and thus also for having such issues dealt
with by state courts who are likely to be more attuned to state politics-but only,
again, if state courts are willing to intervene. See text accompanying notes 177-183
supra.
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edly a factor in the Supreme Court's willingness in cases like Griffin, 20 1 Green,90 2 and Swann 20 3 to demand not only that mandated
segregation be abandoned, but that some affirmative action (such as
busing) be undertaken to bring about integration. Affirmative action may also be necessary to remedy economic segregation. Yet
even the interventionist New Jersey Supreme Court has been unwilling to go very far in this regard, as illustrated by its handling of
the exclusionary-zoning issue.
The New Jersey Supreme Court has been one of the leaders
in attacking exclusionary zoning. In Southern Burlington County
N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mt. Laurel2 0 4 the court held unconstitutional a local zoning ordinance which forbade multifamily
housing and established large minimum lot-size, frontage, and
building-size requirements. It ruled that local land-use regulations
may not "foreclose" and must "affirmatively afford" the opportunity
for low- and moderate-income housing to be built in accordance
with the municipality's "fair share" of the regional need for such
housing.2 0 5 Further defining its ruling, the court stated that zoning
must permit multifamily housing, small dwellings on very small
lots, low-cost housing and high-density zoning in general. 200 When
it came to the remedy, however, the court reversed the trial
court's order which nullified the entire zoning ordinance and required the community to submit to it "a plan of affirmative public
action." 20 7 Instead, the New Jersey Supreme Court left it up to the
municipality to amend its zoning ordinance to bring it into compli20 8
ance with the court's ruling.
Two years later, in Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of
Madison,209 the court was willing to take the small additional step
of authorizing the trial court to retain jurisdiction in the case of a
municipality whose zoning was held exclusionary in the initial trial
and which had developed an amended ordinance which was also
challenged and found unacceptable. Still, the trial court was di-

201. Griffin v. County Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
202. Green v. County Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
203. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
204. 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808
(1975).
205. Id. at 174, 336 A.2d at 724.
206. Id. at 187, 336 A.2d at 732.
207. Id. at 192, 336 A.2d at 734.
208. Id.
209. 72 N.J. 481, 371 A.2d 1192 (1977).
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rected to allow the municipality time to develop its own nonexclusionary zoning ordinance, and only upon the municipality's
failure to do so was the trial court to appoint its own experts to develop a remedial plan. 2 10 Moreover, the court refused to allow the
trial court to set a specific number of lower-cost units for which the
ordinance must provide. 2 11 Finally, the court specifically declined
to order the affirmative relief pressed for by public-interest advocates in amicus briefs and supported by Justice Pashman in his sep2 12
arate opinion.
Even if developed, however, new nonexclusionary zoning ordinances are unlikely to result in low-cost housing in communities
like Mt. Laurel and Madison Township. First, private developers
may be unwilling to build such housing in the face of high land and
construction costs, as well as the demand for more profitable highincome housing. Should a court order a community to adopt an
inclusionary ordinance mandating private developers to include
low-cost or subsidized housing in their projects? Such ordinances
raise tricky legal and policy issues which make judicial reluctance
2 13
to mandate them understandable.
Even with an inclusionary ordinance, suburban housing within
the means of most lower-income people depends on the existence
of subsidy programs which have traditionally been funded at the
federal and state levels. Suppose subsidy funds are unavailable due
to lack of appropriations or administrative decisions that particular
communities are inappropriate sites for subsidized housing or that
particular developers are not competent to build it. Should a court
order appropriations by legislative bodies not a party to the
exclusionary-zoning suit, or remake administrative decisions regarding siting and developer competence? In so doing, a court
would obviously be invading areas traditionally reserved to other
210. Id. at 552-53, 371 A.2d at 1227-28.
211. Id. at 531, 371 A.2d at 1213.

212. Justice Pashman would have had the trial court join all municipalities in
the housing region; require them to make studies identifying local and regional
housing needs; specify a fair share for each municipality based on the municipality's
own recommendation as well as data developed by court-appointed experts; and require each municipality to submit a remedial plan to meet its fair share and to include necessary zoning changes and "affirmative programs" such as the establishment of a housing authority, density bonuses, and inclusionary conditions on
subdivision. Id. at 582, 371 A.2d at 1243-44 (Pashman, J., concurring).
213. Will they deter development? Are they a taking without compensation?
See KIeven, Inclusionary Ordinances-Policyand Legal Issues in Requiring Private
Developers to Build Low Cost Housing, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1432, 1473-1528 (1974).
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branches of government more responsive to public will and possessing greater expertise.
Fortunately, less intrusive affirmative-action remedies are
available to courts. In fact, federal subsidies are now available, and
there is a federal policy of dispersing subsidized housing into
suburbia. In addition, subsidized housing can be developed by
public as well as private entities. Consequently, a court might order an exclusionary community to create a housing authority and
take advantage of available subsidy programs. That could be done
utilizing existing resources and without requiring the direct expenditure of money by the community. Such relief would be modest at best, the amount of subsidies available nationwide being only
a fraction of the number of families eligible for subsidies. 21 4 But at
least it would be a start toward putting housing for lower-income
people on the ground in exclusionary communities.
Yet, while indicating that a community may have a moral obligation to have a public-housing authority, the New Jersey Supreme
Court was unwilling in Mt. Laurel and Oakwood at Madison to
make that a legal obligation. That these cases represent the limit of
court intervention in New Jersey, for the time being at least, was
indicated in Pascack Association, Ltd. v. Mayor and Council of
Township of Washington,2 15 in which the New Jersey Supreme
Court refused to extend Mt. Laurel and Oakwood at Madison to a
fully developed community which completely excluded multifamily
housing. The court stated quite clearly how it views its role:
[I]t would be a mistake to interpret Mt. Laurel as a comprehensive displacement of sound and long established principles concerning judicial respect for local policy decisions in the zoning
216
field.
The sociological problems presented by this and similar
cases . . . call for legislation vesting appropriate developmental
control in State or regional administrative agencies. The problem
217
is not an appropriate subject of judicial superintendence.

Those who favor judicial intervention with respect to exclusionary zoning might hope for greater affirmative relief than the
214. See DeLeeuw, "The Housing Allowance Approach," reprinted in G.
COOPER, C. BERGER,

P.

DODYK,

M.

PAULSEN,

P. SCHRAG & M. SOVERN,

LAW AND

766, 770 (2d ed. 1973).
215. 74 N.J. 470, 379 A.2d 6 (1977).
216. Id. at 481, 379 A.2d at 11.
217. Id. at 488, 379 A.2d at 15 (citations omitted).
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New Jersey Supreme Court was inclined to give. But they should
recognize that reluctance to intrude on legislative responsiveness
and administrative expertise will inevitably limit how far courts will
be willing to go. Political battles must still be fought. At least the
New Jersey Supreme Court has taken a moral stand against exclusionary zoning, thereby encouraging state legislative action to supervise local zoning and perhaps enhancing the political power of
the poor.
Finally, class-struggle issues interrelate with the political process in ways that can undercut the effectiveness of court intervention or even cause more harm than good. Courts are sensitive to
the spillover impacts of their decisions, and may thus be less willing to intervene when they perceive potentially adverse impacts.
For example, adverse spillover effects may explain the Burger
2 18
Court's retreat in the desegregation cases.
Similar considerations are likely to limit the relief interventionist courts would be willing to grant in class-struggle cases. In
this regard exclusionary zoning seems to pose fewer adverse
spillover problems than school finance or welfare rights. If anything, requiring suburban communities to open their doors to
lower-income people and minorities should deter the flight to the
suburbs which has led to central-city racial and economic segregation.
Moreover, the economic and social impacts on suburbs should
be relatively minor, even if a court orders affirmative relief. The
construction of lower-priced housing may cause some increased
property tax burden on more affluent residents, but such housing
will likely represent a small share of the total housing stock in developing suburbs. The construction of housing within the means of
low- and moderate-income people will depend on the existence of
subsidies which may be limited in supply. 2 19 It is unlikely a court
would order a suburban community to directly subsidize lower-cost
housing itself, so compliance would be possible through the use of
existing resources. At most, the fair-share approach would result in
218. See text accompanying notes 69-81 supra.
219. Even with subsidized housing, most housing in developing suburbs (those
most likely to face exclusionary-zoning suits) is new or relatively new and thus beyond the means of a large segment of the population whose incomes are too high to
be eligible for subsidies and too low to afford anything but the older, used housing
available in greatest quantity in the central cities and older suburbs. It will take
many years before the used housing in many suburban communities trickles down to
these lower-middle-income people.
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modest inroads for lower-income people into suburbia, and would
take years to make a significant impact. The gradualness of the
process should make it more palatable to suburbanites, though it
does suggest limits to the ability of courts to rectify the problem.
The school-finance and welfare-rights issues are more troublesome since they raise the spectre of massive court-ordered redistribution of wealth. Suppose in a school-finance case a court were to
order equal per-pupil expenditures. That would require the state
either to reallocate current educational funds by taking from richer
and giving to poorer districts, or to come up with additional funds
to bring the poorer districts up to the level of the richer ones. If
the state chooses to level up, instead of increasing taxes it might
well reallocate monies from other welfare programs. It might, for
example, provide less generous subsidies for food, clothing, and
housing. Given the deference even an interventionist court is likely
to give to the level of welfare benefits fixed by a state, a court
would be hardpressed to prevent the reallocation.
To conclude, however, that the question of wealth redistribution should be left totally up to the government's discretion is
unacceptable. That would mean that courts are bound not to intervene when the impact of their decisions might be to require anything more than a minor redistribution.220 Yet a major premise of
this Article is that our society is so structured, politically and economically, that a significant discrete minority will be relegated to
low-income status for the foreseeable future if the poverty problem
is left entirely to the political process.
The resolution, then, ought not to be nonintervention, but a
recognition that remedial difficulties may require give and take between the courts and the political branches. Only as a last resort,
and in some instances not even then, should courts mandate solutions. Instead, they should prod legislatures to act, requiring legislatures to remedy violations on their own and rejecting solutions
that are obviously inadequate. Admittedly, such an approach has
drawbacks. Some recalcitrant legislatures may never be prodded
into action. However, as the school-desegregation experience dem220. In fact, one could read the Supreme Court's handling of the class-struggle
cases as evidencing less of a willingness to intervene as the potential redistributional
impact of intervention increases. Eliminating the poll tax in Harper and requiring

free transcripts and counsel on appeal in GriffinlDouglas do have some, though minor, redistributional impact. The impact of striking down durational residency requirements for welfare in Shapiro is greater. But those cases pale in comparison with
the potential impact had the Court been willing to intervene in the school-financing
(Rodriguez) and welfare-benefits (Dandridge)contexts.
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onstrates, court-mandated solutions can be circumvented as well.

Court intervention may not be a panacea, but it helps keep the
class-struggle issue before the public, forces the public to grapple
with it, and (a point made here several times for emphasis) perhaps
strengthens the political position of the poor. This seems a proper
and circumspect role for the courts. In that regard the New Jersey
Supreme Court's handling of the school-finance and exclusionaryzoning issues is commendable, while the United States Supreme
Court's decision to stay out of class-struggle issues is unfortunate.
CONCLUSION

The issue is one of legitimacy and competency. Are the courts
the proper place to fight battles over the justice of our economic
system, or do such issues more properly belong in the legislative
arena? To a great degree, the answer is that questions of wealth redistribution are more appropriately dealt with by our more politically responsive bodies. However, to the extent a caste-like system
exists in our society-and for many low-income people, particularly
poor blacks and other racial and ethnic minorities, a caste-like system does exist-the case for court intervention is strong.
I can think of no theory of justice, consistent with democratic
principles, which would condone a caste system. When the Supreme Court upholds the constitutionality of governmental action
(or inaction), it is in effect saying that such action is not inconsistent with our most fundamental democratic ideals. Thus in
Rodriguez the Court has put its stamp of approval on a system of
financing public education which makes it impossible for the children of the very poor to get an education comparable to what more
affluent children have access to. In declining to tackle the
exclusionary-zoning issue, it has put its stamp of approval on a system of land-use planning which ensures that the poor will remain
segregated in lower-class ghettos. And, in giving total deference to
governmental welfare determinations, the Court has opened the
door to imposing on the poor a disproportionate share of the costs
of the inflationary-recessionary era we now face. We should expect
more from the Court. We should expect a statement of its willingness to intervene in an appropriate case and of its moral disapproval when such a case is at hand.
An analogy to racial segregation seems appropriate. In Plessy
v. Ferguson,221 the Court sanctioned mandated segregation. As a
221.

163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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result, segregation thrived in our society until the Court declared
it unconstitutional in Brown. This is not to say that mandatory segregation would still exist in this country were it not for the Supreme Court. It probably would not, since for political and economic reasons the country was ready to be rid of legally mandated
segregation. But the Court's condemnation of segregation was undoubtedly a factor in hastening and gaining public acceptance of
desegregation. While racial discrimination and the use of the government in subtle ways to foster racial discrimination is still widespread in our country, at least the Court has taken a stand against
it. Hopefully, in the long run, the Court's stand will contribute to
the realization of racial equality. Similarly, the Court should take a
stand supportive of the disadvantaged poor (a disproportionate
share of whom are racial minorities) and against our developing
caste system.
We must acknowledge, however, that the Court would have
difficulty remedying class-struggle violations if it were to intervene,
just as it has had difficulty remedying school segregation. But that
is not an argument against intervention. Few would have the Supreme Court reverse Brown v. Board of Education simply because
the Court cannot fully or adequately remedy the situation. If political constraints make formulating remedies difficult, let the Court
tread lightly in that area, but not in expressing disapproval of unjust treatment. There is room for give and take between the Court
and the political branches on the remedial front, and much of the
struggle for class equality will be a political battle in any event.
But since the political process is already weighted against poor
people, the Court should use its considerable moral suasion in
their behalf. This is the great role it has come to play in our society, and this is the role it now abdicates.
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